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Once we commit ourselves to such big verbal creatures as “offers for 
bilateral contracts” or “offers for unilateral contracts,” instead of 
analyzing the transaction in terms of promises and consequences, the 
other mistakes follow almost naturally and inevitably. 
—Samuel J. Stoljar1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Longstanding conventional wisdom has commonly characterized 
the insurance policy as a subspecies of unilateral contract,2 although this 
classification of policies has been a relatively underdeveloped part of 
insurance law scholarship.3  Tradition also regarded unilateral contracts 
 
 *  The Authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, 
University of Hawaii, and Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd 
School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.  Thanks to Bill Boyd, Bob Jerry, Erik Knutsen, 
Doris Lee, Ted Lee, Ann McGinley, Jay Mootz, Joe Perillo, Jim Rogers, Keith Rowley, Adam 
Scales, John White, and participants at the February 2010 AALS Contracts Section Conference at 
UNLV, and the members of AALS Contracts listserv for ideas and insights on this topic.  Thanks 
also to Jeanne Price, David McClure and Shannon Rowe for valuable research assistance. 
  We are particularly appreciative of Professor Perillo’s thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft of this Article, as they helped us solidify our views.  In an April 5, 2010 email, Professor 
Perillo asked whether our “quarrel is really with the law of the conditions” and challenged us to 
take on that “bigger project.”  We agree that a rigid application of the law of conditions has often 
impeded justice, particularly because insurance contracts are already troubled by inherent 
inequalities between the parties.  However, rather than upending the law of conditions or asking 
that insurance become more of an exception within contract law than it already is, we believe that 
insurance contracts can be liberated from the harsh effects of several contract doctrines, including 
conditions, by recognizing their bilateral nature. 
  Professor Perillo also questioned whether our characterization of forfeiture provisions in 
insurance policies as liquidated damage provisions in disguise was accurate.  When a 
policyholder loses coverage for a seemingly trivial failure to provide notice or to cooperate with 
the insurer, conventional analysis is that the policyholder forfeits coverage for noncompliance 
with a condition.  We view these provisions as an insurer’s attempt to impose liquidated damages 
upon the policyholder—no coverage as a penalty for breach.  To view it this way invites courts to 
evaluate these provisions under a test of reasonableness in light of actual damages. 
 1 The False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J. 515, 524 
(1955). 
 2 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.10, at 58 (6th ed. 
2009); 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1.23, at 95 (Perillo rev. ed. 1993); 
accord MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 151 (8th 
ed. 2005) (“Most insurance contracts are unilateral contracts.”); GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES 
OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 99 (9th ed. 2005) (“An insurance contract is a unilateral 
contract.”); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND 
INSURANCE 167 (8th ed. 1999) (same); see also, e.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100 Ill. 
644 (Ill. 1881); Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 9 (Iowa 1868); Gen. Credit Corp. v. Imperial 
Cas. & Indem. Co., 95 N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 1959); Rittenhouse Found., Inc. v. Lloyds London, 277 
A.2d 785 (Pa. 1971). 
 3 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.  Unlike insurance texts designed for 
insurance and business curricula, legal texts on insurance frequently do not even mention the 
unilateral/bilateral contract distinction.  The most commonly used one and two-volume treatises 
fit this mold.  See, e.g., LORELIE S. MASTERS, JORDAN S. STANZLER & EUGENE R. ANDERSON, 
INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION (2d ed. 2004) (no discussion of the unilateral/bilateral 
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distinction as applied to insurance policies); PETER  J. KALIS ET AL., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO 
INSURANCE COVERAGE (1997) (same); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, 
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (13th ed. 2006) (same); ALLAN D. WINDT, 
INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES (3d ed. 1995) (same).  But see 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 
HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §§ 4.2, 11.2 (2d ed. 1998) (extensive multi-volume 
insurance law treatise touches on the unilateral/bilateral contract distinction).  Of course, treatise 
writers in glass houses should not throw stones.  See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009) (no discussion of unilateral/bilateral 
distinction).   
  The same lack of interest in the unilateral/bilateral distinction pervades insurance law 
casebooks.  See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2005) (no mention of unilateral/bilateral dichotomy); TOM BAKER, 
INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2008) (same); EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER & 
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW (Rev. 3d ed. 2006) (same); ROGER C. 
HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY, II, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2001) 
(same); ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE: MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL 
DOCTRINES, AND REGULATORY ACTS (1989). 
  It appears that one needs to go back half a century to find even modest discussion of the 
unilateral/bilateral distinction as applied to insurance policies.  See, e.g., EDWIN W. PATTERSON, 
ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 11, at 65 (2d ed. 1957) (setting forth traditional view of 
insurance policy as unilateral contract and devoting one long paragraph to the matter).  Only one 
modern casebook even touches on the issue and it does not use the word “unilateral” in its short 
discussion.  See LEO P. MARTINEZ & JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 
LAW 59 (5th ed. 2006). 
With a typical bilateral contract, the parties exchange performances and receive the 
benefits of performance simultaneously, and a breach is generally easily identifiable.  
With insurance policies, on the other hand, the insured tenders performance in the form 
of payments of premiums and the insurer is obligated to perform only if some event 
identified in the policy triggers the performance—recall the concept of a condition 
precedent. 
Id. 
  Examination of the unilateral or bilateral nature of insurance policies has been an 
underdeveloped aspect of general contracts scholarship as well.  All contracts treatises and 
casebooks at least touch on the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy.  However, many casebooks do so 
only through a case involving the issue and most treatises devote little attention to the distinction.  
See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4 (4th ed. 2004) (dedicating two pages of 
900-page treatise to the unilateral/bilateral distinction; noting that the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts abandons the terminology).  But see id. § 3.3, at 111 n.5 (noting existence of reverse-
unilateral contracts that result “from an offer of a performance for a promise, rather than an offer 
of a promise for a performance” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 55 cmt. a 
(1981))).  Few casebooks or treatises mention insurance policies as an example of a unilateral 
contract and only the Calamari and Perillo treatise gives the matter significant attention.  See, e.g., 
IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, CONTRACT LAW 305 (7th ed. 2008) (setting forth a 
“unilateral contract sampler” of eight cases, none involving insurance policies); RANDY E. 
BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 342-68 (4th ed. 2008) (extensive focus on 
unilateral contract issues but no mention of insurance policies); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. 
BUSHAW, CONTRACT: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 117-28 (2003) (covering 
unilateral/bilateral distinction without mention of insurance policies); STEVEN J. BURTON, 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 52-58 (3d ed. 2006) (no mention of insurance as unilateral 
contract); MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS, AND 
PROBLEMS 112-29 (1992) (discussing unilateral contracts at length but not mentioning insurance 
policies; includes Peters v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 420 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. App. 1988), an 
employment case where plaintiff was a terminated agent for the insurer rather than a 
policyholder); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 59-66, 76 (4th ed. 2004) (setting forth traditional dichotomy without 
mentioning insurance policy); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS 372-77 (8th ed. 2003) 
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as relatively rare.4  Karl Llewellyn viewed them as the equivalent of 
“bearded ladies” found in the “freak tent” of a circus.5  Commercial 
contracts that were not rewards or bonuses were viewed as rarer still, 
with brokerage arrangements traditionally standing as the leading 
example of commercial unilateral contracts.6  Moreover, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts implicitly abolished the 
terminology,7 although it was subsequently argued with some force that 
 
(covering unilateral/bilateral distinction without mention of insurance policies); DAVID G. 
EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 109-29 (2d ed. 2006) 
(addressing unilateral contracts and acceptance by performance but not using insurance policies 
as example); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4 (4th ed. 2004) (setting forth traditional 
dichotomy without mentioning insurance policy); id. §§ 67-69, at 152-58 (no mention of 
insurance as type of unilateral contract); JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS § 1.02[C] 
(2d ed. 2009) (outlining unilateral/bilateral dichotomy but making no mention of insurance); LON 
L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 86-88, 504-35 (8th ed. 2006) 
(same); JAMES F. HOGG ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 223-48 (2008) (extensive discussion of unilateral/bilateral distinction but no 
mention of insurance policies); CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 33-63 (6th ed. 2007) (no mention of insurance policies in discussion of 
dichotomy); GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M. LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND 
LITIGATION 75-93 (2d ed. 2008) (no mention of insurance as type of unilateral contract); JOHN 
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 125-32 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing 
concept with no mention of insurance policies); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS § 17 (4th ed. 2001) (same); SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 1:17 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007) (covering unilateral and bilateral concepts 
with no express mention of insurance policies and citing to only two cases, amongst the scores 
cited in the section, where an insurer is party: Nat’l Sur. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 106 S.E. 179 (Ga. 
1921), and Schoff v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa 1999)). 
 4 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 551 (1983) 
(“[L]ack of support for the unilateral contract idea in the cases required [legal scholars] to 
illustrate the concept with ridiculous hypotheticals about climbing greased flagpoles and crossing 
the Brooklyn Bridge.”); accord FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.24, at 183 (“The 
popularity of the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical has been due in part to the lack of more practical 
illustrations.”); see also infra Part I regarding the development of the unilateral/bilateral 
distinction and the origin of the now-famous Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical. 
 5 K. N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 
36 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract (Part I)]. 
 6 See infra Part I; see also contracts treatises and casebooks cited supra note 2.  The vast 
bulk of unilateral contract cases cited, reproduced, or discussed in these sources involve efforts by 
plaintiffs to collect a reward or prize, or the attempt of a broker (usually real estate) to recover a 
commission.  See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.24.  Certain cases in the reward 
genre are perennially popular.  See, e.g., Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 
(Ct. App.) (U.K.) (payment of reward/penalty where user of purported influenza prevention 
device contracts the flu); see also Leonard v. Pepsico, 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(collector of millions of “Pepsi points” not entitled to collect reward of military plane from 
television advertisement because advertisement was an obvious farce and it contained insufficient 
detail to constitute an offer rather than an invitation to make an offer); Lefkowitz v. Great 
Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957) (first customer in line claims 
reward of free fur coat).  Another commonly included case, Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E.2d 428 
(N.Y. 1928), involves a mortgagor’s thwarted attempt to pay off the mortgage early in response to 
the mortgagee’s offer because the mortgagee sold the mortgage to a third party and managed to 
blurt out that fact to the mortgagor before the mortgagor tendered payment. 
 7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 32, 62 (1981); see also infra Part I.  The 
Restatement (First) of Contracts stated “[a] unilateral contract is one in which no promisor 
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courts never abandoned the distinction8 and that the concept served a 
perhaps surprising modern function in protecting weaker parties to 
arrangements that did not quite qualify as traditional contracts.9 
One can argue that the unilateral or bilateral status of the insurance 
policy is something like Holmes’s clavicle of the cat: a vestige from 
another era with little or no modern relevance.10  We contend that in the 
case of insurance, the distinction is unhelpful and that the unilateral 
characterization is less persuasive than deeming insurance policies 
bilateral contracts.  But, whether correct or incorrect, helpful or 
distracting, concepts and classifications are important.  The 
characterizations and labels affixed to objects and activities 
understandably affect their use and perceptions about them.  To name 
something is to know it.11  Conceptualizing the insurance policy as 
unilateral (or reverse-unilateral)12 enshrines an incorrect understanding 
of the nature of insurance contracting, the insurance policy, and the 
 
receives a promise as consideration for his promise.  A bilateral contract is one in which there are 
mutual promises between two parties to the contract; each party being both a promisor and a 
promisee.”  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932). 
 8 See Pettit, supra note 4, at 551 (suggesting that, based on analysis of its appearance in 
reported cases, “[the] unilateral contract never died, but is alive and thriving as never before”). 
 9 See id. at 552 (“Of particular importance is the use of unilateral contract to establish one-
way obligations of such institutions as employers, governments, and schools toward individuals 
with whom they deal.  Unilateral contract has become an important concept in defining 
relationships that arise in our increasingly organized society.”); id. at 594 (“In the modern cases 
judges generally use unilateral contract to impose liability” on employers, governments, schools 
and other defendants against whom plaintiffs are seeking to enforce purported rights.); see also 
David G. Epstein & Yvette Joy Liebesman, Bearded Ladies Walking on the Brooklyn Bridge, 59 
ARK. L. REV. 267, 296 (2006) (noting Pettit’s research and finding 435 reported decisions issued 
between 2000 and 2006 that used the term “unilateral contract” although it was “less clear” how 
the concept was being deployed and to what result). 
 10 See O.W. Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. REV. 609, 630-
31 (1879) (“[E]ach new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents.  But as 
precedents survive like the clavicle in the cat, long after the use they once served is at an end, and 
the reason for them has been forgotten, the result of following them must often be failure and 
confusion from the merely logical point of view.”). 
 11 Actually, Dewey made the observation with the aid of a less prominent coauthor.  See 
JOHN DEWEY & ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, KNOWING AND THE KNOWN 147 (1949) (“[N]aming is 
seen as itself directly a form of knowing . . . .”).  More expansively, Dewey and Bentley asserted 
that the labels or signposts used to characterize thinking or conduct themselves became important 
factors in the construction of thought and analysis.  See id. ch. 5, at 147 (“In a natural factual 
cosmos in course of knowing by men who are themselves among its constituents, naming 
processes are examined as the most readily observable and most easily and practicably studied of 
all processes of knowing.”). 
 12 See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (explaining the characterization of insurance 
policies as a type of “reverse-unilateral” contract on the theory that the performance by the 
policyholder, through payment of the premium, antedates performance by the insurer); see also 
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 58 (“In the usual unilateral contract, the promise is made by the 
offeror.  However, there exists an unusual kind of contract called a reverse-unilateral contract.  In 
a reverse unilateral contract the offeree makes the only promise.”); id. (using insurance policy as 
express example of reverse-unilateral contract); Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 285 
(reiterating concept generally without consideration of application to insurance). 
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insurer-policyholder relationship.  It is, in our view, more wrong than 
right13 and distracts rather than illuminates or assists.  More importantly, 
it fails to appreciate the degree to which insurance policies differ from 
most contracts,14 the harms caused by the characterization, and the 
degree to which insurance policy construction needs liberation from this 
archaic dichotomy even more than contract law generally.15 
Treating insurance policies as unilateral contracts appears to be 
both conceptually wrong and largely pointless in that insurance disputes 
are less often about contract formation and more often about the scope 
and availability of coverage provided under the policy.16  More 
important, use of the unilateral construct produces inconsistent, 
incorrect, and unfair results in application.17  One might defend the 
characterization as one that permits the policyholder (as the purportedly 
non-promising party) to terminate the policy at will without penalty.18  
But this freedom is a bit like Anatole France’s biting witticism that 
under law, both rich and poor alike are free to sleep under a bridge.19  
Policyholders20 generally will benefit much more from fair application 
of the insurance protection they have purchased (a goal undermined by 
the unilateral characterization) than from somewhat greater freedom to 
switch or drop insurance policies.  On balance, the unilateral 
characterization of insurance policies, to the extent it possesses 
continued force, hurts policyholders and undermines the operation of 
insurance more than it protects either party or promotes the economic 
and social goals of insurance.21  Any legal rule or categorization that 
does more harm than good deserves to be interred. 
Part I of our exploration addresses the history, theory, and doctrine 
of unilateral contracts, while Part II notes the degree to which the 
insurance policy—as a “reverse-unilateral” contract—is a particularly 
 
 13 See infra Part III.A. 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 See infra Part III.A. 
 17 See infra Part III.C. 
 18 See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
 19 See ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILLY: IMMORTALS CROWNED BY THE FRENCH 
ACADEMY (1894) (“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep 
under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”). 
 20 For clarity and ease of reference, this article uses the term “policyholder” rather than 
“insured” whenever possible.  Technically, of course, there is a distinction in that a person or 
entity can be “an insured” under the policy even if it is not the person or entity that procured the 
insurance, paid the premiums, or is named in the policy.  See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, apps. 
A-G (reproducing representative policies with a definition of who is “an insured” that is broader 
than the named policyholder or purchaser).  For example, the employees of a commercial 
policyholder, when acting within the scope of their employment, are usually “insureds” for 
purposes of liability policy protection.  See, e.g., Insurance Services Office (ISO), CG 00 01 10 
01 (2000), sec. II, reprinted in FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, app. E, at 11. 
 21 See infra Part III.C. 
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rare bird even within the ornithology of traditional contract 
characterization.22  Part III addresses the problems presented by a 
unilateral categorization of insurance policies, including not only its 
questionable utility and shaky conceptual foundations that fail to 
appreciate the special sphere of insurance, but also the largely 
deleterious practical problems presented by the unilateral model of 
insurance policies.23  We conclude that common law should characterize 
insurance policies as bilateral agreements and should evaluate their 
terms and conditions under this model.  Courts should abandon the 
presumption that insurance contracts are unilateral and instead should 
remain faithful to contract law’s preferences for bilateralism and 
promises over unilateralism and conditions. 
 
II.     THE UNILATERAL/BILATERAL DISTINCTION:  
HISTORY, THEORY, AND DOCTRINE 
 
According to classical contract doctrine, a traditional unilateral 
contract is different from a bilateral contract because it always and 
necessarily contains a promise on only one side.24  In exchange for that 
promise, the promisor seeks a performance and only a performance 
from the other party—no promise of performance will do.  It is at the 
instant of completion of performance that the contract is formed, and 
fully executed on one side.25  On the other hand, in a bilateral contract, 
an offer may be accepted by a return promise or by the beginning of 
performance.26  At the moment the promise is made or promised 
 
 22 For example, Professor Perillo, discussing the reverse-unilateral concept, found that the 
“most common reverse unilateral contract arises where the offeree silently accepts services that 
are rendered with the expectation of payment.”  See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 58.  
Without naming it as such, Professor Williston described the reverse-unilateral contract in his 
1924 treatise.  WILLISTON, supra note 3, at 31 (“If the offer contemplates the formation of a 
unilateral contract, it may be that the offeror proposes to exchange his own promise for an act of 
the offeree or, conceivably, that the offeror proposes to exchange an act on his part for a promise 
which he requests from the offeree.” (emphasis added)). 
 23 See infra Part III. 
 24 As Professor Perillo explains: “Every contract involves at least two contracting parties.  In 
some contracts, however, only one party has made a promise and therefore only this party is 
subject to a legal obligation.  Such a contract is said to be unilateral.  In contrast, a contract where 
both parties have promises is bilateral.”  PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 56-57; see also 
contracts casebooks and treatises cited supra note 3 (expressing a similar concept of unilateral 
and bilateral contracts). 
 25 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1932); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10; 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4; I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of 
Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1916) [hereinafter Wormser, True Conception] 
(“When an act is thus wanted in return for a promise, a unilateral contract is created when the act 
is done.”). 
 26 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 53 cmt. a (1932); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 
2.10; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4.  
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performance begins, a bilateral contract is formed and each party is 
bound.27 
The unilateral/bilateral distinction, although a staple of twentieth 
century contract law, particularly as taught in law schools, was of little 
or no import until well into the late nineteenth century.28  Harvard Law 
School Dean and case method inventor Christopher Columbus 
Langdell29 is generally credited with elevating the unilateral/bilateral 
distinction to contract law’s great dichotomy,30 which was embraced as 
the conventional wisdom, even though the distinction was familiar 
enough to have been used in opinions issued prior to or 
contemporaneous with Langdell’s casebook.31  Although it was not a 
 
 27 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 52 cmt a. (1932); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 
2.10; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4. 
 28 See C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 183, at 248 (2d ed. 
1880) [hereinafter LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS]; WILLISTON, supra 
note 3, § 13, at 11 n.42 (using dichotomy and ascribing to Langdell); Epstein & Liebesman, supra 
note 9, at 271-77 (noting that the unilateral/bilateral classification of contracts arose during the 
nineteenth century and is generally credited to Langdell); see also C.C. Langdell, Mutual 
Promises as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 HARV. L. REV. 496, 498 (1901) (responding to 
Williston’s implicit criticism regarding the utility of the dichotomy). 
 29 At least Langdell is commonly credited with establishing the case method.  But see Epstein 
& Liebesman, supra note 9, at 271 n.9 (noting that legal historian James Willard Hurst viewed 
John Norton Pomeroy as the father of case method while contracts scholar Williston saw Harvard 
Professor James Barr Ames as the initiator of case method at Harvard (citing JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 261 (1950) and SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 205 (1941) (also stating that Langdell was 
primarily a lecturer during much of his career because of poor eyesight))). 
 30 See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 985-1094 (2d 
ed. 1879); see also CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1871); LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note 
28 (slightly revised version of Langdell’s Second Edition).  As Epstein and Liebesman note, 
Langdell’s original casebook “had none of Langdell’s words” and contained “only a few hundred 
cases, without commentary.”  Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 271.  The second edition, 
however, also contained a “250-page summary at the end of the casebook, like an early version of 
Gilbert’s” and “was obviously written primarily to help students learn contract law from the 
casebook.”  Id. at 271-72.  It was in this summary that Langdell used the terms unilateral and 
bilateral.  Id. at 272. 
 31 See, e.g., Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Burden, 30 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., 
dissenting) (applying New York law, surety arrangement “became a unilateral contract when the 
surety performed”); London Assurance Corp. v. Thompson, 62 N.E. 1066, 1067 (N.Y. 1902) 
(“insurance policies are unilateral contracts”) (in context, however, it may be that the court used 
the term “unilateral” to mean a contract of adhesion); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Wickham, 35 S.E. 287, 
289 (Ga. 1900) (insurance policy is a unilateral contract); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100 
Ill. 644 (Ill. 1881) (same); Douglas v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 83 N.Y. 492, 503 (N.Y. 1881) 
(characterizing insurance policy as a unilateral contract); Cobb v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 11 Kan. 93, 
98 (Kan. 1873) (insurance policy is “wholly a unilateral contract”); Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 
26 Iowa 9 (Iowa 1868) (insurance policy unilateral). 
  English courts appear to have embraced the unilateral/bilateral distinction by the mid-
nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Fishmonger’s Co. v. Robertson, (1843) 134 Eng. Rep. 510, 523 
(noting that there are “‘a great number of cases of contract not binding on both sides at the time 
when made, and in which the whole duty to be performed rests with one of the contracting 
parties’” (quoting Kennaway v. Treleavan, (1839) 151 Eng. Rep. 211, 213)); id. at 524 n.3 
(labeling such arrangements as “perfect unilateral contracts”); Phillips v. Aflalo, (1842) 134 Eng. 
STEMPEL.32-1.DOC 9/7/10  9:44 PM 
2010]      M ISCLASSIFYING THE INSURANCE POLICY  93 
common feature of case law, the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy feature 
appears to have become established contracts orthodoxy by the early 
twentieth century,32 as reflected in the Williston treatise,33 the Corbin 
treatise,34 and other authorities of the era.35  There was, however, debate 
about the accuracy of the unilateral/bilateral terminology and its 
utility.36 
The unilateral/bilateral dichotomy was driven home (and arguably 
made starker) in a prominent law review article by Professor I. Maurice 
Wormser,37 who created one of law’s most famous illustrations: the 
Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical.  In the oft-told hypothetical, one party 
offers $100 to a second party if he will walk across the Bridge, thereby 
creating and completing a contract that is unilateral because the promise 
 
Rep. 348, 352 (“There may be a contract binding on one party and not on the other; as in the case 
of a guarantee, which is of this nature: ‘if you will supply goods to a third person, I will see that 
you are paid.’  In such a case it is optional whether the party will supply the goods.”); see also M. 
POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS 89 (1826) (labeling 
contracts as reciprocal and unilateral, using a loan with a promise to repay as an example, a 
transaction that would now be viewed as a reverse-unilateral contract).  Although Pothier was 
French, his translated work was highly influential in England and elsewhere.  Certainly by the 
twentieth century, classic English law treatises embraced the unilateral contract concept.  See, 
e.g., 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY: A 
TREATISE OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE 
LAW OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 22 (7th ed. 1906) (citing early cases and noting that “[a]n offer 
proposing a unilateral contract becomes a binding promise immediately upon the performance of 
the act or acts requested”). 
 32 See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 26 n.1 (Arthur 
L. Corbin ed., 3d ed. 1919); POLLOCK, supra note 31 (stating that the unilateral/bilateral contract 
distinction was well-established by the end of the nineteenth century or the early twentieth 
century). 
 33 See WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 13, at 11 n.42. 
 34 See ANSON, supra note 32, at 26 n.1; ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
21 (1950). 
 35 See, e.g., 1 ADDISON, C. G., ADDISON ON CONTRACTS: BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 7 (Horace Smith ed., 8th ed. 1888) (“When the contract binds one person to another 
without any engagement being made by the latter, it is unilateral.”). 
 36 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 273-75 (noting and citing criticism). 
 37 See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25.  Notwithstanding that the Wormser article 
is cited in only twenty-two law review articles (as of December 1, 2009), it is mentioned in nearly 
every contracts treatise or casebook that gives significant attention to the unilateral/bilateral 
distinction which is, as noted supra note 2, nearly every contracts treatise or casebook. 
  Wormser’s view of unilateral contracting was stark in the sense, as discussed below, that 
he viewed the offeror as having unfettered rights to withdraw or modify the offer until the last 
instant before completion of performance, regardless of the seeming unfairness this posed for an 
offeree who had completed ninety-nine percent of the task without gaining any benefit of the 
bargain.  As Epstein and Liebesman note, however, Langdell’s casebook “distinguishes bilateral 
contracts from unilateral contracts on the basis of what the offeree does or says rather than on the 
basis of what the offeror said.”  See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 272.  As a result, 
Langdell would have found enforceable unilateral contracts created in situations involving partial 
performance or substantial (but imperfect) performance, thus expressing a considerably kinder 
and gentler vision of unilateral contracting than that advanced by Wormser in his 1916 Yale Law 
Journal article.  See id. (referring to hypotheticals involving offer of compensation for painting 
fence earlier in article). 
STEMPEL.32-1.DOC 9/7/10  9:44 PM 
94 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 32:1 
of payment is accepted, not by the promise of trekking over the Bridge, 
but by completion of the trek itself.38  In addition, “only one party is 
bound”—the offeror—hence classification of the arrangement as 
unilateral rather than bilateral.39 
[I]n unilateral contracts, on one side we find merely an act, on the 
other side a promise.  On the other hand, in bilateral contracts, [a 
party] barters away his volition in return for another promise. . . .  
[T]here is an exchange of promises or assurances . . . [and] both 
parties . . . are bound from the moment that their promises are 
exchanged.40 
However, although the offeror is bound to pay upon completion of 
the walk across the Bridge, in Wormser’s view, he retains the power to 
withdraw the offer without penalty until the last second prior to 
completion of the crossing.41  This view, even though apparently largely 
accepted at the time, came under consistent fire from contract scholars 
because of its inherent unfairness.  The hapless offeree could get ninety-
nine percent of the way across the Bridge and end up with nothing, not 
even quantum meruit compensation for his time and effort.  Similarly, 
the imaginary offeree of perhaps the second most famous unilateral 
contract hypothetical—someone climbing up a flagpole to obtain a 
prize—could be thwarted inches from the top of the pole by a cruel and 
cackling offeror.42 
Professor Wormser was aware of, but undaunted by, such displays 
of bleeding heart empathy: 
The objection is made, however, that it is very “hard” upon B 
that he should have walked half-way across the Brooklyn Bridge and 
should get no compensation . . . .  Critics of the doctrine of unilateral 
 
 38 As outlined by Professor Wormser: 
  Suppose A says to B, “I will give you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn 
Bridge,” and B walks—is there a contract?  It is clear that A is not asking B for B’s 
promise to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge.  What A wants from B is the act of 
walking across the bridge.  When B has walked across the bridge there is a contract, 
and A is then bound to pay to B $100.  At that moment there arises a unilateral 
contract.  A has bartered away his volition for B’s act of walking across the Brooklyn 
Bridge. 
See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25, at 136. 
 39 See id. (“When an act is thus wanted in return for a promise, a unilateral contract is created 
when the act is done.  It is clear that only one party is bound.  B is not bound to walk across the 
Brooklyn Bridge, but A is bound to pay B $100 if B does so.”). 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. at 136-38. 
 42 By 1939, these hypotheticals must have been firmly established in law teaching, prompting 
Llewellyn to complain that real life business cases have little to do with “the idiosyncratic desires 
of one A to see one B climb a fifty-foot greased flagpole or push a peanut across the Brooklyn 
Bridge” that apparently preoccupied classrooms.  K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: 
Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 785 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of 
Contract (Part II)]; see also Pettit, supra note 4, at 551 (noting widespread use of flagpole-related 
hypotheticals, including greased flagpoles, to illustrate unilateral contracting). 
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contract on the ground that the rule is “hard” on B, forget the 
primary need for mutuality of withdrawal and in lamenting the 
alleged hardships of B, they completely lose sight of the fact that B 
has the same right of withdrawal that A has. . . .  [T]he doctrine of 
unilateral contract is thus as just and equitable as it is logical.  So 
long as there is freedom of contract and parties see fit to integrate 
their understanding in the form of a unilateral contract, the courts 
should not interfere with their evident understanding and intention 
simply because of alleged fanciful hardship.43 
In response to the perceived unfairness, a consensus arose that the 
beginning of performance in response to a unilateral contract offer 
permitted enforcement of the contract if the offeree completed the 
task.44  However, mere preparation to perform was insufficient; the task 
sought needed to have been commenced.45  Eventually, even Professor 
Wormser accepted this view and conceded that his earlier position was 
incorrect.46  During the same time period, the doctrines of promissory 
 
 43 See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25, at 138.  In addition to lacking empathy for 
the Bridge walkers and flagpole climbers of the world, Professor Wormser also appears to have 
harbored a view of the importance of mutuality that is now regarded as incorrect.  Courts have 
stated, and do occasionally still, that there cannot be a contract unless other parties are bound.  
However, this view, at least in absolutist form, is widely regarded as incorrect by mainstream 
contracts scholars and case law.  See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 2, § 4.12, at 177 (arguing that the 
phrase that “both parties must be bound or neither is bound . . . is an over-generalization.  The 
doctrine is not one of mutuality of obligation but rather one of mutuality of consideration. . . .  
The concept of ‘mutuality of obligation’ has been thoroughly discredited.”); id. (noting that the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not always require mutuality of consideration and that 
“[i]n a unilateral contract there is no mutuality of obligation”); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 
supra note 3, § 3.2; FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 87 (arguing that the notion of 
“principle of mutuality” asserted “as a general rule of contract law that both parties must be 
bound or neither is bound . . . needs more qualification than it usually receives in judicial 
opinions” and in fact “requires a good deal of qualification”); WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 7:13 
(same). 
 44 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmts. a & b (1932); Peter M. Tiersma, 
Reassessing Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1992) (noting academic support for part performance formation of unilateral contracts 
and adoption of the view in the Restatement (First) of Contracts).  Academic support for this 
view existed around the time Wormser staked out his extreme position.  See, e.g., Clarence D. 
Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter Promise, 23 HARV. L. REV. 
159, 164 (1910); Henry W. Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial 
Performance of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REV. 94, 96-97 (1921); Arthur L. Corbin, Offer 
and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 191-92 (1917) 
(beginning of part performance of the requested act precludes the offeror from effectively 
revoking and gives contract rights to the performer who completes the act); D.O. McGovney, 
Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARV. L. REV. 644, 658-60 (1914).  
 45 See, e.g., Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83 So.2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (making a 
distinction between the actual beginning of performance, which establishes a contract, and mere 
preparation to perform, which does not). 
 46 See I. Maurice Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 146 (1950) [hereinafter 
Wormser, Book Review] (reviewing EDWIN W. PATTERSON & GEORGE W. GOBLE, CASES ON 
CONTRACTS (1949)).  Wormser noted that his 1916 article was quoted in the casebook but 
“[s]ince that time I have repented, so that now, clad in sackcloth, I state frankly, that my point of 
view has changed.  I agree, at this time, with the rule set forth in the Restatement of the Law of 
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estoppel and substantial performance, both of which could also protect 
the bridge walker and the flag climber, were also gaining support.47 
The resulting taming of the potential unfairness of the unilateral 
contract helped to cement its status as part of the legal lexicon.  The first 
Restatement of Contracts formally recognized the unilateral/bilateral 
dichotomy and divided the universe of contracts accordingly.48  
However, the Restatement also established a presumption in favor of a 
bilateral characterization of contracts where feasible,49 reflecting the 
prevailing common law approach.50  Notwithstanding its firm place in 
the contracts establishment, the concept of the unilateral contract 
continued to be questioned and even attacked, initially and most 
 
Contracts of the American Law Institute, Section 45” that the beginning of performance by a 
unilateral contract offeree creates enforceable contract obligations and limits the offeror’s rights 
of revocation.  Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). 
 47 See PERILLO, supra note 2, §§ 6.1-6.4; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 2.19; 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (noting the rise of promissory estoppel and 
substantial performance doctrine during mid-twentieth century); Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of 
Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and Commercial Uncertainty Before Williston’s 
Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 563 (2004). 
 48 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932). 
 49 The relevant section provides: 
In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the formation of a bilateral contract 
by an acceptance amounting in effect to a promise by the offeree to perform what the 
offer requests, rather than the formation of one or more unilateral contracts by actual 
performance on the part of the offeree. 
Id. § 31. 
  The Restatement (First) of Contracts justified the presumption as fairer and more benign, 
explaining, “[i]t is not always easy to determine whether an offeror requests an act or a promise to 
do the act.  As a bilateral contract immediately and fully protects both parties, the interpretation is 
favored that a bilateral contract is proposed.”  Id. cmt. a. 
 50 See, e.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d 1026 (Cal. 1934) (courts have preference to construe 
contracts as bilateral if possible).  Like chestnuts of unilateral contracting such as Carlill v. 
Carbolic Smoke Ball, Davis v. Jacoby has been popular in contracts casebooks.  In Davis the 
California Supreme Court construed an uncertain contract as bilateral to protect the reliance 
interests of a couple induced to relocate from Canada to take care of elderly friends in response to 
an offer of compensation through the older couple’s estate upon death.  Id.  However, the elderly 
husband/promisor died before making the will that was to have provided the promised 
distribution, thereby revoking his offer prior to the younger couple’s performance.  Id.  Thus, 
under the traditionalist perspective of the early twentieth century, if the arrangement was 
unilateral, the contract under the prevailing views of the time had not adequately been accepted 
and formed so as to create enforceable rights.  But if bilateral, the arrangement resulted in an 
enforceable contract because the younger couple had accepted through assuring that they would 
come to the aid of their older friends. 
  Well before mid-century the Restatement (First) of Contracts and cases like Davis v. 
Jacoby had established a preference for bilateral characterization of contracts.  The intellectual 
and judicial inclination favoring bilateralism was thought sufficiently important that Davis v. 
Jacoby is often reproduced contracts casebooks.  See, e.g., BLUM & BUSHAW, supra note 3, at 
117-28; BURTON, supra note 3, at 52-58; CRANDALL & WHALEY, supra note 3, at 59-66, 76; 
DAWSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 372; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 118-23; FULLER & 
EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 86-88, 504-35; HOGG ET AL., supra note 2, at 235; KUNEY & LLOYD, 
supra note 2, at 76. 
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prominently by leading law professor Karl Llewellyn51 and later more 
directly by then-prominent Australian contracts scholar Samuel 
Stoljar.52 
However, the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy continued to hold its 
ground as part of mainstream contracts theory for some time, although 
gradually losing ground in academic and lawmaking circles.  The 
Uniform Commercial Code, largely authored by Llewellyn, did not 
incorporate the concept,53 while the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
also attempted to shed the unilateral/bilateral contract dichotomy.54  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts dropped references to unilateral and 
bilateral contracts in its black letter text, determining that the terms 
confused rather than clarified the law of contracts and stating, “[i]t has 
not been carried forward because of doubt as to the utility of the 
distinction, often treated as fundamental, between the two types.”55 
In the courts, however, the dichotomy retained support and 
arguably even enjoyed a renaissance of sorts.  The unilateral construct 
was applied to a range of emerging contract matters involving claims of 
at-will employees and persons seeking to enforce government 
entitlements,56 while continuing to be used in cases involving rewards 
and prizes57 or brokerage commissions.58  The courts’ use of a unilateral 
contract construction as a mechanism to protect weaker parties gives the 
authors pause at any impulse to abolish this genre of contract 
altogether.59  Despite that, it appears to us that the arguably beneficial 
roles of the doctrine could be equally achieved under theories of 
promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and attachment of due process 
 
 51 See Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract (Part I), supra note 5, at 36; Llewellyn, Our 
Case-Law of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 813-14. 
 52 See Stoljar, supra note 1. 
 53 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 59-60 (noting that the UCC does not make a 
unilateral/bilateral distinction and that section 2-206(1)(b), which states that an ambiguous offer 
to purchase goods “invites acceptance either by performance or promise,” prevents use of a 
“unilateral contract trick”). 
 54 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9 (discussing the history of and rationale for 
abandoning the unilateral/bilateral terminology). 
 55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. f, reporter’s note (1981). 
 56 See Pettit, supra note 4, at 551-52. 
 57 See Tiersma, supra note 44, at 79 (rewards and prizes continue to be a leading area of 
unilateral contract analysis); Mark B. Wessman, Is “Contract” the Name of the Game? 
Promotional Games as Test Cases for Contract Theory, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 635, 645-54 (1992) 
(noting that unilateral contract theory is often applied to rewards, prizes, games, and contests). 
 58 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4 (brokerage cases are a significant 
example of unilateral contract decisions). 
 59 As described by Professor Pettit, these modern applications of unilateral contract theory 
tend to provide rights to persons or entities that can largely be described as litigation’s “little 
guys” who might otherwise be taken advantage of by larger, wealthier, more sophisticated 
litigants.  See Pettit, supra note 4, at 551-52; id. at 594 (“In the modern cases judges generally use 
unilateral contract to impose liability.  They begin by finding an implied promise by the 
defendant and then justify enforcement of that promise solely by invoking the unilateral contract 
idea.”). 
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rights to the creation of reasonable expectations of an entitlement from 
governments.60 
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts eliminated 
“unilateral” and “bilateral” contracts from its lexicon, it did not 
eliminate the concept that some contracts could be accepted only by 
performance, and that they were fully executed on one side by that 
performance.61  Moreover, even while abandoning the dichotomy, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts retained a preference for bilateral 
construction of contracts in a roundabout fashion, providing that, “[i]n 
case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept 
either by promising to perform what the offer requests or rendering the 
performance, as the offeree chooses.”62 
The preference for bilateralism remains if the offeree may choose 
between accepting by promise or performance because “[s]uch an 
acceptance operates as a promise to render a complete performance.”63  
In cases of doubt, the offeree’s performance stands in the place of a 
promise by which the offeree is bound and must complete performance.  
In addition, despite the retreat in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
from the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy, courts generally continue to use 
the terminology and continue to adhere to the presumption in favor of 
bilateralism.64  As contract law entered the twenty-first century, the 
often-maligned unilateral contract was perhaps bloody but largely 
 
 60 Professor Pettit acknowledges this prospect.  See, e.g., id. at 588-96 (noting that notions of 
estoppel, public policy, and due process entitlements may support outcomes reached under 
unilateral contract approach); id. at 594 (“In most situations, and particularly in contexts in which 
courts are expanding the scope of obligation into new areas, there are both promissory and non-
promissory reasons for imposing liability.  Recognition and articulation of each might lead to 
better-reasoned and more consistent decisions.”); id. at 589 (“Although it certainly can be argued 
that in the last half-century government has been making more promises and creating more 
expectations, the primary explanation for increased judicial intervention lies in social, intellectual, 
and political developments and not in the ‘promise principle.’” (citing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE 
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 
733 (1964))). 
 61 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 289-94.  The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 45 (1981) retains the concept of unilateral contracts, substituting the language, by 
describing the situation where an offeror “invites an offeree to accept by rendering performance 
and does not invite a promissory acceptance.” 
 62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 32 (1981). 
 63 Id. § 62. 
 64 See, e.g., Fosson v. Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
under California law a contract is rebuttably presumed to be bilateral); Woodbridge Place 
Apartments. v. Wash. Square Capital, Inc., 965 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Indiana law 
and determining that when language in loan commitment contract is ambiguous contract is 
bilateral); Rode Oil Co. v. Lamar Adver. Co., No. W2007-02017-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 
4367300, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (“[W]e note that many authorities speak of a 
long-established presumption against finding a unilateral rather than a bilateral contract where 
there is doubt as to which type of contract was intended.”). 
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unbowed, with use of the concept continuing in judicial decisions, to the 
praise of some commentators.65 
 
II.     THE INSURANCE POLICY AS A “REVERSE-UNILATERAL” CONTRACT 
 
Despite more than a century of debate on the “great dichotomy” 
dividing the contracts of the world into unilateral and bilateral,66 little 
had been done to assess insurance policies (although they were 
historically viewed as unilateral).  Professor Joseph Perillo, the most 
prominent contracts scholar67 to devote any significant attention to the 
unilateral/bilateral distinction in insurance, not only placed insurance 
policies squarely within the unilateral camp, but also fine-tuned the 
conventional assessment by referring to some insurance policies as 
“reverse-unilateral.”68  The reverse-unilateral term is used in only a few 
cases of any type69 and employed in only two reported insurance 
coverage decisions,70 although the mere description of the insurance 
policy as unilateral appears in many more cases71 (but few law review 
articles). 72 
 
 65 See, e.g., Pettitt, supra note 4, at 551-52. 
 66 See Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract (Part I), supra note 5, at 36; see also 
Tiersma, supra note 44, at 8-11 (noting the importance of classification in twentieth century 
contracts law). 
 67 Professor Perillo’s treatise, PERILLO, supra note 2, is one of the leading treatises in the 
field.  Professor Perillo has been a member of the Fordham Law School faculty for more than 
forty-five years and has authored many scholarly articles and been a prominent speaker and 
panelist on contract matters.  Consequently, his express insistence that insurance policies are 
unilateral contracts carries substantial weight, particularly in view of the relative absence of other 
scholarly commentary on the issue. 
 68 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 58; see also Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 
285 (using the Calamari and Perillo treatise as a basis for reverse-unilateral contract category).  
The general concept of a reverse-unilateral contract was described in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1932) (“Unilateral Contract Where Proposed Act is to Be Done by 
Offeror”) and in WILLISTON, supra note 3, at 31. 
 69 Fewer than ten cases discuss and consider the concept of a reverse-unilateral contracts.  
See, e.g., Southtrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So.2d 184 (Ala. 2000) (concerning the enforceability 
of an arbitration provision in a checking account); Herman v. Stern, 213 A.2d 594 (Pa. 1965) 
(concerning a brokerage commission). 
 70 See Winters v. State Farm Ins. & Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Okla. 1999); Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357 (Kan. 1998). 
 71 But there are not all that many cases relative to the universe of contract decisions.  As of 
March 10, 2010, only 223 cases in the LexisNexis database specifically described the insurance 
policy as unilateral, although this implicit description appears to be hardwired into the 
background assumptions of insurance law.  As discussed below, there is a long line of precedent 
restricting a policyholder’s right to recover on a theory of anticipatory breach or repudiation and 
strictly construing requirements listed as conditions in the policy.  Both traits are more consistent 
with a unilateral characterization than a bilateral characterization.  See infra Part III. 
 72 As of March 10, 2010, only twenty-three articles in the LexisNexis legal periodical 
database used the terms “reverse-unilateral.”  Most used the term to describe “shrinkwrap” 
contacts.  See, e.g., Steven A. Heath, Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion: Revisiting the 
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The insurance policy could be characterized as a unilateral contract 
principally because of the perceived absence of a promise on the part of 
the policyholder.  As discussed in Part I, where only one party to a 
contract promises and the other performs, historically the contract has 
been deemed unilateral.  For the typical unilateral contract, an offer or 
conditional promise is first made (e.g., “I’ll pay you $100 if you walk 
across the Brooklyn Bridge”).  The offer is accepted and is completed 
by performance following the offer (e.g., the offeree walks across the 
bridge, hopefully before any revocation by the offeror).73 
In contrast to typical unilateral formation, in an insurance policy, 
the policyholder often makes payment (performance) prior to receiving 
promises by the insurer such as indemnity for loss and defense of 
liability claims.  Because the insurance policy is aleatory,74 the 
policyholder may never receive any indemnity or defense from the 
insurer.  However, through the insuring agreement contained in the 
policy, the insurer in effect promises to provide protection or payment 
to the policyholder in the event of a covered occurrence.  When 
payment by the policyholder precedes the insurer’s promise to insure, 
the resulting contract is a reverse-unilateral contract and the 
 
Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” Licenses, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 12 (2005); Deanna L. 
Kwong, The Copyright-Contract Intersection: SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. & 
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349 (2003).  A significant 
number also described employment-at-will contracts in this manner.  See, e.g., Richard A. Lord, 
The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 707 (2006); Brian T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers From 
Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 
(2003).  A moment’s reflection leads to some of the same concerns this Article expresses as to 
whether the classification of these arrangements as reverse-unilateral contracts is really correct, a 
topic beyond the scope of this Article.  One can say with confidence that the concept of the 
reverse-unilateral contract, however creative, has not significantly penetrated the legal lexicon. 
 73 See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25, at 136.  For a fascinating examination of 
the tragic historic circumstances producing a Supreme Court opinion permitting the type of 
revocation and unfairness attacked by critics of traditional unilateral contract doctrine, see Joseph 
M. Perillo, Screed for a Film and Pillar of Classical Contract Law: Shuey v. United States, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 915 (2002) (describing a case in which citizen giving information leading to 
capture of co-conspirator in Lincoln assassination was denied reward due to government’s 
revocation of offer by means far less prominent than initial offering of reward and because Court 
construed offer to require that claimant himself effect capture). 
 74 See DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 163 (parties to insurance policy “know in advance the 
dollars they will exchange will be unequal”); REJDA, supra note 2, at 99 (“An insurance contract 
is aleatory rather than commutative” in that the “values exchanged may not be equal but depend 
on an uncertain event” while commutative contract “is one in which the values exchanged by 
both parties are theoretically equal.”).  Emmett and Therese Vaughan state that an aleatory 
contract is one in which: 
[T]he outcome is affected by chance and [] the number of dollars given up by the 
contracting parties will be unequal.  The insured pays the required premium, and if no 
loss occurs, the insurance company pays nothing.  If a loss does occur, the insured’s 
premium is small in relation to the amount the insurer will be required to pay.  In the 
sense that it is aleatory, an insurance contract is like a gambling contract. 
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 168. 
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policyholder is the offeror according to Professor Perillo.75  Indeed, 
insurers typically structure the transaction in this manner so that their 
underwriting departments can vet the applicant prior to acceptance and 
avoid issuing policies to bad risks.76  By making an application and 
paying the premium, the applicant-cum-policyholder seeks a promise 
from the offeree—the insurer.  After the premium is paid and the 
application approved, the insurer provides its promise to the insured. 
Two courts have stated, in accord with the Perillo analysis, that the 
insurance policy “is a reverse-unilateral contract in that the applicant’s 
acts of performance induce insurer’s promise.”77  Under this approach, 
the insurance contract forms upon the payment of a premium by the 
policyholder.  In exchange for the premium payment, the insurer 
promises to provide insurance coverage.  “The insured has not made 
any promise, but rather, has performed.”78  Because only one promise 
(that by the insurer) has been given, “the contract fits within the 
standard definition of a unilateral contract.”79 
There has been some dissent to the unilateral orthodoxy.  Professor 
Karl Llewellyn, writing in 1939, lamented the characterization of 
insurance as unilateral, noting that it just did not feel correct. 
Insurance has sometimes been thought a type of contract formed as a 
unilateral.  Outside of twenty-five cent a week “industrial insurance,” 
I do not find it so.  Fire insurance “binders”; initial premiums “paid” 
by check, whether the check be given with the application or after 
approval; blanket coverage billed monthly according to user thereof–
this is the picture as I get it, with most of it in terms of initiation by 
agreement and mutual obligation.80 
But unlike Llewellyn’s criticism of unilateral contracts generally, 
his position on insurance as bilateral has not gained traction.  The 
prevailing view among those few commentators and courts that have 
considered it remains that “all forms of insurance are presumed to be 
unilateral contracts.”81  Dean Robert Jerry, addressing the question of 
 
 75 Professor Perillo explains:  
In a reverse-unilateral contract the offeree makes the only promise.  For example, if A, 
a homeowner, pays $500 to an insurance company asking for the company’s promise 
to pay A $200,000 if A’s house is destroyed by fire, A is the offeror but has made no 
promise.  Rather A has performed and requested a promise from B, the offeree. 
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 58. 
 76 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 3.01-3.02. 
 77 Winters v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Okla. 1999) (quoting 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 1998)). 
 78 Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 600 n.18 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 814. 
 81 Winters, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 845.  When insurance is renewed periodically, courts often 
construct the contract as “‘a series of unilateral contracts, each beginning with the payment of a 
premium for a specified period . . . and terminat[ing] at the expiration of that . . . period.’”  
STEMPEL.32-1.DOC 9/7/10  9:44 PM 
102 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 32:1 
whether an insurance contract is bilateral or unilateral, essentially 
answered with another question: “Who cares?” 
One who labors through this theoretical quagmire is likely to be 
disappointed by the following observation: whether an insurance 
contract is categorized as bilateral, unilateral, reverse-unilateral or 
bilateral-become-unilateral has no apparent significance.  However 
the offer-acceptance process is described, the result upon the 
successful completion of this process is a promise for the breach of 
which the law will give a remedy—in short, a contract.82 
Although Dean Jerry is correct that the unilateral/bilateral 
dichotomy appears to add nothing to our understanding of insurance 
disputes, he unduly minimizes its largely negative impact on the 
operation of insurance and the resolution of insurer-policyholder 
disputes.  In an exchange between Professor Perillo and Dean Jerry, the 
two scholars defended both their divergent characterizations of 
insurance policies and their differing views as to the consequences of 
the characterization of policies.  Professor Perillo argued that viewing 
the policy as a unilateral contract compels a different result in many 
insurance cases than would a bilateral characterization.83  In essence, we 
 
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 206 P.3d 481 (Idaho 2009) 
(quoting Guy v. Guy, 560 P.2d 876, 878 (Idaho 1977)). 
 82 ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 31[a], at 224 (3d ed. 2002).  Dean 
Jerry shares our skepticism over a unilateral construction.  “Although an insurance contract could 
theoretically be structured in either form, insurance contracts are usually bilateral.”  Id. at 223. 
 83 See Email from Joseph M. Perillo to Robert H. Jerry, II (Mar. 24, 2009) (on file with 
Cardozo Law Review) (finding Professor Jerry’s view of “no practical significance” to the 
characterization question as “astonishing” and contending that judicial enforcement of conditions 
in policies, rather than treating these provisions as promises, is heavily influenced by the 
unilateral nature of insurance policies).  Dean Jerry responded to Professor Perillo:  
[T]he problem with [unilateral contract] analysis is that a unilateral contract is not 
formed until performance is completed (the offeree can walk away during performance 
without liability) and it makes no sense to say that an insurer can cancel a contract at 
will any time prior to the end of the contract’s term.  Likewise, to say that the insurer is 
bound to do nothing at the outset of the policy term makes no sense; instead, what the 
insurer provides, in exchange for the insured’s promise to pay a premium (not that the 
insurer’s duty will be constructively, and perhaps expressly conditioned on the 
insured’s performance of that promise) is an immediate promise to pay proceeds (and 
to do other things, like defend in the case of liability insurance) on the condition that a 
loss within coverage occurs.  Indeed, the economics of an insurance contract involve a 
present transfer: the insured provides the premium (or promise thereof), and the insurer 
provides security through a present promise to assume risk and pay proceeds in the 
event of a covered loss.  So in every sense of the concept, an insurance contract is an 
immediate bilateral exchange with consideration on both sides. 
  . . . . 
[But] I cannot recall ever seeing a case where the court’s labeling of the contract as 
“unilateral” or “bilateral” made a difference to the outcome; even if a court goes down 
the “unilateral” path, which makes little sense (as noted above), the outcome will be 
explainable if the contracts is properly understood as bilateral. 
Email from Robert H. Jerry, II to Joseph M. Perillo (Mar. 28, 2009) (on file with Cardozo Law 
Review).  Dean Jerry also suggested that the General Credit case in the Perillo casebook could be 
explained in a manner consistent with characterization of the policy as a bilateral contract.  Id.; 
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conclude that Dean Jerry is correct as to the characterization and that 
Professor Perillo, although incorrect as to characterization, is right about 
the consequences of classification.  Part III below explores this seeming 
paradox, outlining not only the case for bilateral status but also the 
manner in which a unilateral characterization creates mischief in 
insurance coverage disputes. 
 
III.     PROBLEMS WITH A UNILATERAL CATEGORIZATION OF  
INSURANCE POLICIES 
 
The continuing persistence of the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy, 
particularly the alleged status of insurance policies as reverse-unilateral 
contracts, continues to present problems for the operation of insurance.  
As an organizing concept, the unilateral/bilateral or reverse-unilateral 
classification does little to help resolve insurance disputes because most 
such disputes involve the construction of a concededly applicable policy 
rather than disputes over contract formation.84  As reflected in 
 
Gen. Credit Corp. v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 95 N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 1959).  Professor 
Perillo responded: 
Your book states that there is no practical reason to label a contract as unilateral or 
bilateral.  I question that conclusion.  Of course, there are conditions in bilateral 
contract if they are clearly stated but there is a canon of construction that says if the 
language assigning a task is unclear as to its intended legal effect, the preferred 
construction is that the language creates a promise rather than a condition.  This maxim 
cannot logically be applied to a unilateral contract because in a unilateral contact, by 
definition, only one party is ever under an obligation and only one party speaks.  
Therefore, it makes a difference which classification is chosen.  In General Credit and 
many cases like it, the court makes the point that only one party (the insurer) speaks.  It 
treats the contract as unilateral. 
  You argue that the insurer cannot simply walk away.  That is because it has 
received consideration for its promise.  To my way of thinking, unilateral contract 
analysis explains why the insurer cannot sue the insured for not cooperating, etc. 
  I am aware of a trend that resists treating late notice of an insured event as a 
failure of condition.  But wouldn’t it make more sense to say that conditions in 
insurance policies are sometimes treated as sui generis where the insurer is not 
prejudiced[?] 
Email from Joseph M. Perillo to Robert H. Jerry, II (Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with Cardozo Law 
Review). 
 84 See insurance treatises and casebooks cited supra note 3.  Nearly every case reproduced, 
discussed, or cited in those sources involves a dispute over the meaning and application of an 
insurance policy rather than a dispute over whether a contract was in fact made and a policy 
issued.  Although insurers often argue that a policy is no longer in effect because of 
misrepresentation, fraud, or lapse of premium payment (the last item tending to refute the 
traditional view that insurance is always reverse-unilateral because the policyholder performs at 
the outset), these defenses seek to terminate or rescind a policy rather than to argue that the 
contract was never formed.  There may also be issues of lost policies in which the question then 
becomes proof of insurance.  See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.17.  
But, this is not a defense questioning the mechanics of contract formation.  There may also be 
disputes about whether insurance evidenced by a binder (for property insurance) or conditional 
STEMPEL.32-1.DOC 9/7/10  9:44 PM 
104 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 32:1 
illustrations such as the Brooklyn Bridge and flagpole hypothetical, 
unilateral contract doctrine has largely focused on formation and 
revocation of contracts rather than their construction.85  More troubling, 
a closer look at insurance policies and their operation strongly suggests 
that they are in fact bilateral agreements in which promises are 
exchanged and not the reverse-unilateral oddities of conventional 
wisdom.  Finally and most importantly, the dominance of the unilateral 
characterization of insurance policies has produced problematic results 
in insurance coverage cases. 
 
A.     Conceptual Concerns: The Questionable Continuing Utility  
of the Unilateral/Bilateral Distinction 
 
As discussed above, mid-twentieth century contracts scholars and 
contemporary insurance scholars have questioned whether the 
unilateral/bilateral contract distinction has any meaning.  Karl 
Llewellyn was probably unilateralism’s most famous critic and his 
attack continues to resonate today.  He viewed the preoccupation with 
unilateralism, and its obsession with performance versus promise, as 
running counter to the common sense of real world contracting actors 
who seek to attain objectives rather than to engage in a ritualistic and 
formalistic process of contract formation.86  Professor Peter Tiersma 
summarized Llewellyn’s argument: 
[A] definite offer can be accepted in any reasonable way of 
expressing agreement unless the offeror specifically requires 
otherwise.  Real people outside of lunatic asylums do not offer a 
promise for a promise.  What businessmen offer is an assurance that 
after a deal is ‘on,’ it will not be withdrawn, and that performance 
will occur in due course.87 
Perhaps the most vocal critic of the unilateral contract concept 
itself was Professor Stoljar, whose attack on unilateral contract theory 
as insufficiently protective of reliance interests likewise resonates well 
in the modern legal world. 
 [T]he distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts is 
false because it establishes a contrast between expectation- and 
 
receipt (for life insurance) is operative.  See WIDISS, supra note 3, § 2.3, at 43-62.  But these 
cases largely involve the application of the binder or receipts language rather than doctrinal 
questions of contract formation. 
 85 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical 
and flagpole hypothetical); infra Part III.A (discussing the focus of unilateral contract doctrine 
and the debate on contract formation). 
 86 See Llewellyn, On Our Caselaw of Contract (Part I), supra note 5, at 36; Llewellyn, Our 
Caselaw of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 788-89. 
 87 See Tiersma, supra note 44, at 9. 
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restitution-contracts but totally ignores the reliance-bargain.  The 
distinction completely obscures the logical interrelation involved in 
the protection of the three contractual interests.  If our law of 
contract at one end protects restitution (and indeed must protect 
promised restitution if promises are to be enforceable at all), and at 
the other end protects promised expectations (including purely 
aleatory expectations), the law must logically also protect actual 
reliance justifiably induced by the promisor.  Again, by confusing 
two different meanings of acceptance, the distinction disregards a 
third type of acceptance and hides the identity of acceptance and 
reliance in the reliance-bargain.  The promisee’s reliance is as much 
a manifestation of assent to the exchange which the promisor 
proposes in his promise as is the counter-promise in the bilateral 
contract.88 
To the extent that these criticisms have any weight at all, they are 
more compelling in the insurance context, perhaps particularly so 
because of the asserted “reverse-unilateral” nature of insurance 
contracts as compared to other species of unilateral contract.  To echo 
Professor Stoljar’s concern, reliance interests are at particularly high 
tide where insurance is concerned.  Trite as it may sound, policyholders 
do pay premiums in order to obtain the “peace of mind” of knowing that 
they are protected from potential liability or loss.89  Insurance is defined 
as the incurring of a small but certain loss (the premium payment) in 
return for protection against a larger but contingent loss.90  Putting the 
peace of mind concept more technically, the policyholder as part of a 
risk management plan devotes a set portion of its resources to the 
purchase of contractual protection against contingent risk.91  Premiums 
are prepaid (at least prior to any loss if not prior to inception of the 
contract) so that the insurer may obtain the investment benefits as part 
of a comprehensive system of social risk-spreading and financing of 
risk management. 
In addition, the policyholder has relied not only by spending 
money that it could have otherwise invested itself for self-insurance or 
other gain, but also by forgoing the opportunity to purchase alternative 
insurance products.  The policyholder is now highly dependent on the 
insurer for performance.  After a loss or liability event has occurred, the 
policyholder is effectively precluded from purchasing insurance from 
 
 88 See Stoljar, supra note 1, at 534 (citing Llewellyn, On Our Case-law of Contract (Part I), 
supra note 5, at 33-36; Llewellyn, Our Case-law of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 792-98). 
 89 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642 n.10 (1975); Apartment Inv. & 
Mgmt. Co. v. Nutmeg, 593 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010); Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
539 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 90 See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 3-4; FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, §1.02, at 14. 
 91 See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 4-7; DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 2-8; FISCHER ET AL., 
supra note 3, §§ 1.01-1.02; REJDA, supra note 2, at 20-22; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, 
at 12-14; see also DORFMAN, supra note 2, ch. 3. 
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another carrier.92  Even commercial entities with solid balance sheets 
depend on insurance to maintain liquidity.  If an insurer fails to perform 
without coercion, a policyholder may be substantially hurt even if it 
later prevails in coverage litigation.  Without the expected insurance 
protection (which usually includes legal defense to liability claims as 
well as payment to enable repair and rebuilding in property claims) 
promptly provided, even commercial policyholders may face cash flow 
problems and perhaps even insolvency as well as severe damage to 
reputation and ability to continue operations.  Individual policyholders 
may lose homes, opportunity for medical care, or experience financial 
ruin.93 
To the extent that unilateral characterization of contracts is 
conceptually problematic in general, the discord is heightened when 
unilateral contract doctrine is applied to insurance.  Of course, some 
degree of intellectual incoherence may be justified in the service of a 
needed concept.  However, the Llewellyn and Stoljar criticisms strongly 
suggest that the concept is unnecessary, especially when applied to an 
area of law in which there is relatively little dispute over matters of 
contract formation.  Although not attacking the unilateral contract 
concept itself, two commentators recently found it to be essentially 
useless as a legal tool, even in the context of contract formation: “The 
important question is how a court determines whether there is a 
contract, not whether courts continue to use the phrase ‘unilateral 
contract.’ . . . The words ‘unilateral contract’ are no more important in 
answering these ‘real world’ questions than the words ‘Denny 
Crane.’”94 
 
 92 After filing a claim for a loss, a policyholder will often not be able obtain insurance, at 
least under normal circumstances and for reasonable rates.  There are, however, instances in 
which an insurer will underwrite coverage after the loss or liability event.  For example, 
billionaire financier Warren Buffett’s companies have been known to issue liability policies 
covering a pipeline of anticipated claims, expecting to make money if correctly calculating the 
amount of premium dollars and investment income that can be collected in relation to the 
eventual final tally of payments necessary to resolve pending claims.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of 
Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 467 (2006).  Another example was provided when liability 
insurance was sold (undoubtedly at high premium) to the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino after a 
tragic fire spurred many claims, with MGM “offloading” the risk of paying for complete 
resolution of the claims to the insurer, which collected the large premium, invested it, and then 
attempted to pay claims as parsimoniously and gradually as possible so as to profit from the 
arrangement.  See In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 928 (D. Nev. 1983). 
 93 For examples of how fragile a grip on solvency may be held by individuals and small 
businesses, see Robert M. Lawless, Bankruptcy Filing Rates After a Major Hurricane, 6 NEV. 
L.J. 7 (2005); Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 969 (2005). 
 94 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 307 (referring to the rakish main character—a 
senior attorney played in typical over-the-top fashion by the irrepressible actor William Shatner 
of Star Trek and Priceline fame—in then-popular television program Boston Legal (ABC 
television network 2004-2008)). 
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The unilateral/bilateral distinction focuses almost exclusively on 
matters of contract formation and revocation.  The substantial body of 
ink spilled during the twentieth century on the topic centered on the 
factors that made for creation of a contract and on whether one offering 
a unilateral contract could “pull the plug” on an unsuspecting incipient 
acceptor after it had begun to perform the requested act sought by the 
offeree.  The horrible hypotheticals surrounding the issue, such as 
walking across the Brooklyn Bridge, were exclusively focused on 
whether the promisor would evade a contract when the performer was 
only a few yards from making it to the other borough and emphasized 
that the contract formed by performance rather than a return promise. 
Although the Brooklyn Bridge problem was (and to some extent 
remains) fascinating and fun stuff for the classroom, it focuses—like 
much of the standard contracts course—excessively on issues of 
formation relative to their importance in the real world.95  In most 
contracts litigation, no question exists that there is a contract.  The 
parties are fighting over construction and application of the agreement, 
not its existence or whether an offer was revoked or a deal improperly 
rescinded.  Particularly since the rise of promissory estoppel and 
creation of contract by detrimental reliance, the classic brainteasers 
about contract formation are relatively unimportant for most practicing 
attorneys.  Except for counsel representing real estate brokers, 
companies running contests, or employers concerned over deviating 
from the at-will doctrine through publication of rules or handbooks, the 
 
 95 Contract scholarship and legal education have generally tended to give inordinate attention 
to issues of contract formation relative to the degree to which such issues arise in the real world, 
where issues of interpretation, breach, materiality, and damages appear to dominate the case 
reports.  See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CAROL SANGER, NEIL B. 
COHEN, & RICHARD R.W. BROOKS, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2008) 
(roughly 200 pages of 958-page text devoted to issue of contract formation and 320 pages 
concerning contract construction); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. 
PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2007) (350 or more 
pages in 1046-page text deal with contract formation matters); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. 
KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (4th ed. 2007) (450-500 pages in 1070-page text devoted 
to matters of contract formation).  An arguable exception to this overall tendency is STEWART 
MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (2d ed. 
2003) (80 pages in an 1100-page book devoted to contract formation).  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, Professor Perillo’s casebook is among the most interested in contract formation 
issues.  See PERILLO, supra note 2 (arguably as many as 500 pages of 885-page book focusing on 
contract formation and related issues). 
  To be sure, classification of contract casebook coverage can involve characterization 
questions as debatable as whether insurance policies are unilateral or bilateral contracts (e.g., is 
material on the statute of frauds, incapacity, or unconscionability within the domain of contract 
formation?).  Even if our classification is debatable, it remains obvious that contracts scholars pay 
a good deal of attention to contract formation, perhaps too much in relation to the attention paid 
to contract construction and remedies for breach, which appear to dominate actual contract 
litigation.  The focus on contract formation dwarfs the attention given to assignment, intended 
and incidental beneficiaries, and consideration of parol/extrinsic evidence, topics that get little 
attention in law school but may be frequently litigated. 
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unilateral/bilateral distinction is likely not germane to their practices or 
their clients’ lives. 
This is especially the case with insurance.  Nearly all insurance 
litigation focuses not on whether an insurance policy is in effect, but on 
whether there is coverage under the terms of a concededly operative 
contract.  The issue is usually “is this loss or liability covered?” not “is 
the purported insurance policy in force?”  There are, of course, more 
than a few insurance disputes involving rescission.  However, these are 
not cases involving revocations of an offer.  Instead, the typical 
rescission case alleges that the applicant-cum-policyholder made a 
material misrepresentation inducing conceded issuance of the contested 
insurance policy.  The unilateral/bilateral distinction is irrelevant to 
resolution of such a case. 
Alternatively, insurance litigation may address whether insurance 
is in force prior to the formal issuance and delivery of an insurance 
policy.  Most commonly, this occurs when a life, health, or disability 
applicant/policyholder suffers loss while the application is processing.  
Where the applicant has not yet paid the premium and received a 
conditional receipt, the insurer typically wins easily because it does not 
“accept” the applicant’s offer to buy insurance until it issues the policy.  
As discussed in Part III.B below, the insurer’s issuance of the policy as 
a promise to cover contingent losses or liabilities is better viewed as 
acceptance of the applicant’s offer than as a mere precursor to 
performance of a unilateral contract.  If the insurer has issued a 
conditional receipt, the case will usually be resolved based upon 
interpretation of the conditional receipt rather than upon concepts of 
unilateral and bilateral contracts.96 
In addition, as with other areas of the law, obligations may be 
created by acts or words reasonably inducing detrimental reliance.97  
Consequently, an insurance agent’s statement that an applicant or 
policyholder is “covered” may be enough to establish the existence of 
an insurance policy even without formal application processing and 
insurer issuance of a policy form.98  However, the precise contours of 
coverage remain open for determination based on the type of policy at 
issue; the agent’s statement, even if sufficient to establish an insurer-
policyholder relationship, does not necessarily bind the insurer to 
provide coverage for the loss at issue.  This fact of legal life also 
undermines the potential importance of any difference between 
unilateral contracts and bilateral contracts. 
 
 96 See WIDISS, supra note 3, at 42-64; infra Part III.B. 
 97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
 98 See, e.g., Bill Brown Constr. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1991); 
Dixon v. Pickle, 327 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959). 
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In addition, as contrasted to typical contract relations, the law 
generally views the insurer-policyholder relationship as somewhat 
fiduciary in nature (for most first-party insurance) or even fully 
fiduciary (for liability insurance where the insurer is charged with 
defending and settling claims).99  Although the fiduciary-like duties of 
the insurer do not accrue until there is an insuring agreement in place, 
the special relationship of the parties and the duties of insurer to 
policyholder logically increase the importance of protecting reliance-
based interest.  Even for non-insurance contracting, duties of minimal 
good faith may attach during negotiation100 that prevent sharp practices, 
a duty logically enhanced in the insurance context. 
In the same vein, state law or regulation usually restricts an 
insurer’s right to cancel, further minimizing the possibility that 
unilateral/bilateral concepts can conceivably impact issues of formation, 
rescission, continuation, or modification of an insurance policy.101  
Although the insurer may usually reserve a right to modify policy terms, 
at least when renewing (and sometimes even during the policy period), 
insurers are also usually required to disclose any coverage-reducing 
changes in the policy.102 
The nature of insurance has thus created an environment in which 
contract formation generally is not much of an issue and in which the 
unilateral/bilateral distinction is even less of an issue, at least in the vast 
bulk of insurance matters and disputes.  It therefore seems wasteful and 
misleading to devote significant attention to the unilateral/bilateral 
distinction because it falsely implies that contract formation is a major 
problem of insurance jurisprudence. 
In short, the unilateral/bilateral distinction appears to have nothing 
positive to contribute to insurance law.  As demonstrated in Part III.C 
below, the distinction has adverse effects in disputes surrounding 
insurance contract performance.  Further, as outlined in Part III.B 
below, the classification of insurance policies as unilateral or reverse-
unilateral contracts appears incorrect when one appreciates the actual 
operation of insurance contracting. 
 
 99 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 11.02, 11.06; ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS 
RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G (4th ed. 2007); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 10.01. 
 100 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 272 (1987) (explaining the concept of 
precontractual good faith). 
 101 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.08; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra 
note 3, § 3.16. 
 102 See, e.g., Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1977); 
see also STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 4.09, 4.13. 
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B.     Characterization Concerns: Insurance Policies as Better 
Resembling Bilateral Contracts 
 
For the most part, insurance scholars have devoted almost no 
attention to the issue of whether insurance policies are unilateral or 
bilateral contracts.103  Those that have touched on the issue at all have 
largely reiterated, with little or no comment, the conventional view that 
insurance is a unilateral arrangement—a view largely put forth by 
contracts authorities who conducted relatively limited insurance 
scholarship104—or suggest that the unilateral/bilateral classification is 
unimportant.105 
As noted above, the most influential and authoritative modern 
voice in the classification debate, one strongly supporting the unilateral 
denomination, has been that of Professor Perillo.  His popular treatise 
characterizes the insurance policy as a reverse-unilateral contract 
because the offeror-applicant-policyholder “performs” or fulfills its 
contract obligations in advance by paying a premium in return for the 
insurer’s promise of coverage in the event of loss.106  The Calamari and 
Perillo treatise is unusual in that it both focuses on insurance as a type 
of unilateral contract and uses the term “reverse-unilateral” to more 
closely describe the transaction and bring insurance policies into the 
realm of unilateral contracts.  Most mainstream contracts treatises and 
casebooks not only give little attention to insurance, but also give little 
or no attention to the question of whether insurance contracts are 
unilateral or bilateral.107 
As a result, the limited exploration on the unilateral/bilateral 
question in the context of insurance has largely been the province of 
contract generalists rather than insurance specialists.  Literature labeling 
insurance as a unilateral contract has perhaps for that reason tended to 
overlook or under-appreciate specific aspects of insurance that cast 
doubt on the unilateral characterization.  When viewed in a 
comprehensive, practical, and ongoing fashion, the insurance policy 
begins to look much more like a bilateral contract. 
Consider the basic manner in which insurance is sold.  Insurers are 
ubiquitous advertisers.  Standard contract law doctrine establishes that 
an advertisement is normally not an offer, but instead is an invitation for 
 
 103 See supra note 2. 
 104 See supra note 3. 
 105 See JERRY, supra note 82, § 31, at 224; see also sources cited supra note 3. 
 106 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 57-58. 
 107 See supra note 3. 
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the prospective customer to make an offer.108  Insurers in particular 
attempt to benefit from this construct because the prospective 
policyholder normally must not only ask for insurance but also 
complete an application for insurance that can be reviewed by the 
insurer’s underwriting department to determine whether the insurer 
wishes to assume the risks presented by the particular policyholder for 
the type of insurance sought.109  In addition to giving the insurer the 
option of taking a longer, harder look before committing to cover 
contingent risks presented by an applicant/policyholder, this structuring 
of the transaction permits the insurer to seize upon inaccuracies in the 
application and pursue rescission on misrepresentation grounds where 
the matter is material and substantially inaccurate.110 
Commonly, the applicant also tenders the first premium with the 
application so that coverage is created immediately upon the insurer’s 
approval of the risk and decision to issue the policy.111  Life, disability, 
and individual health insurance often differ in stating that the insurance 
contract is not in effect until the policy is delivered to the 
applicant/policyholder,112 although decades of case law have largely 
turned this into a matter of constructive delivery rather than actual in-
hand receipt of paper by the policyholder.113 
In a perhaps inconsistent approach to the contracting process, 
insurers also commonly issue a conditional receipt when taking a life, 
health or disability application and premium payment.114  Although 
there are several types of conditional receipts, the most common variety 
provides that coverage is considered to begin as of the date of the 
application, provided that the applicant is eligible for the coverage 
sought according to the insurer’s prevailing underwriting criteria.115  In 
this manner, the insurer encourages prepayment of premiums, which it 
can invest, and discourages the applicant from pursuing competing 
insurance products.  The conditional receipt also protects the 
 
 108 See CALAMARI ET AL., supra note 83, at 28-29. 
 109 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 3.01-3.02, 3.06. 
 110 See id. §§ 3.07-3.11. 
 111 See id. §§ 3.01-3.02. 
 112 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 99, § 32; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, 
supra note 3, § 3.06; see also Edwin W. Patterson, Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. 
L. REV. 198 (1919). 
 113 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 99, § 32; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, 
supra note 3, § 3.06. 
 114 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.05; WIDISS, supra note 3, at 
42-63. 
 115 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 99, § 32; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, 
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 2.3 (2d ed. 1989); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 
3, § 3.05. 
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policyholder from fortuitous injury during the pendency of the 
underwriting process, which may take several weeks.116 
By contrast, property and casualty underwriting is more 
encapsulated, with insurers tending to accept risks immediately, often 
through the authority of the sales agent, so long as the information 
provided by the applicant is correct.117  Property insurers, for example, 
issue “binders” rather than conditional receipts and depend on 
misrepresentation and other rescission doctrines to protect themselves 
from unwanted risks.  This is in contrast to the more extensive pre-
policy investigation that accompanies life, health, and disability 
insurance.118 
So far, so good for the proponents of reverse-unilateralism.  The 
applicant is offering to buy insurance and performing its part of the 
bargain by paying the premium.  In return, the insurer accepts the offer 
(and cashes the applicant’s check) while promising to cover specified 
contingent losses that may take place.  Thereafter, however, the 
insurance relationship and the typical insurance claim become 
considerably more complicated than walking across the Brooklyn 
Bridge. 
First, there is the practical matter of premium payment.  Although 
the applicant has paid the initial premium in return for coverage for a 
specified period, modern insurance is often not a one-shot transaction.  
Rather, it tends—at least for many policyholders and insurers—to be a 
classic relational contract.119  The first premium payment is often for a 
short period, perhaps as little as a month.  In order to keep coverage in 
force, the policyholder is required to continue making regular payments.  
Traditionally, insurance premiums were paid every six months, 
although many insurers now bill quarterly.  Perhaps more common still 
is monthly billing facilitated through the regular debiting of the 
policyholder’s checking or savings account.120  All of this requires 
 
 116 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 115, § 2.3; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, 
supra note 3, § 3.05. 
 117 See JERRY, supra note 82, § 33 at 245; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 115, § 2.3; STEMPEL 
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.05. 
 118 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.03(A); JERRY, supra note 82, § 33, 245; STEMPEL 
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.05. 
 119 A relational contract is one in which the parties are or expect to be engaged in ongoing 
interactions and therefore value, among other things, cooperation and flexibility in order to 
preserve the relationship.  See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN 
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical 
View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1985); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: 
Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of 
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 
NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). 
 120 Twenty or more years ago, such arrangements were sufficiently novel to merit substantial 
comment in litigation concerning whether a policy had lapsed due to failure of timely premium 
payment.  See, e.g., Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. v. Lunsford, 324 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).  
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administrative activity by the insurer, both in establishing a regime of 
periodic payment and in tracking and collecting payment. 
As a result, what in first-year Contracts class may look like the 
policyholder’s “complete performance” of its payment obligations in an 
insurance contract begins in operation to look much more like a down 
payment on the policy with a promise to continue paying premiums on 
the policy at regular intervals.  Consequently, the exchange between 
applicant/policyholder and insurer tends in practice to look more like an 
exchange of promises rather than an exchange of performance for 
promise—at least for policyholders who are establishing an insurance or 
risk management program rather than simply buying short-term 
insurance.121 
Proponents of the unilateral school would undoubtedly argue that 
the policyholder’s promise of a continued stream of premium payments 
is not a true bilateral promise because the policyholder is free to stop 
making payments at any time without apparent liability to the insurer.  
However, to the extent this is true (and as discussed below, it is a 
misleading view of the policyholder’s prerogatives), the same might be 
said of magazine subscriptions, record clubs, yard service, pool service, 
or countless other contractual arrangements that are generally regarded 
as bilateral (to the extent anyone pauses to classify them at all). 
Consider what happens when a policyholder ceases paying 
premiums.  The insurer typically sends a reminder of delinquency and 
permits the policy to be reinstated if the past due premiums are made 
good.  It is common, particularly for life, health, or disability insurance, 
for the insurer to provide for a grace period prior to cancelling the 
policy.122  The insurer invests nontrivial administrative resources in 
attempting to induce policyholders to keep their at least implicit 
promises of continued premium payment.  If the policyholder persists in 
nonpayment, the policy lapses and become ineffective or expires by its 
terms. 
Termination of an insurance policy for failure to pay new premium 
obligations that accrue is not much different from failing to renew a 
 
Today, such regular (usually monthly) automatic debiting of a bank account for premium 
payment is widespread.  In addition, other payment arrangements are possible as well.  For 
instance, insurers may collect premiums after the policy has been issued.  See Great Am. Ins. Co. 
v. Matzen Constr. Co., 494 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).  They may also accept 
promissory notes.  See Raney v. Piedmont S. Life Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1967). 
 121 Dean Jerry makes many of these same points in his email exchange with Professor Perillo, 
excerpted supra note 83. 
 122 Dean Jerry views the grace period as the policyholder’s temporary indebtedness to the 
insurer.  JERRY, supra note 82, at 623.  If the new premium is paid, coverage continues, but if it is 
not, then the policy terminates on the date the premium was due.  Id.  If the policyholder dies 
during the grace period, the policy is in effect and the premium is paid out of the proceeds.  Id.; 
see, e.g., Furtado v. Metro. Life. Ins. Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (calculating 
grace period in conjunction with nonforfeiture provision in a whole life policy). 
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magazine subscription (which typically earns the subscriber three to 
four plaintive entreaties from the publisher seeking renewal, often at 
ever more attractive subscription rates).  Similarly, when a customer 
stops paying for lawn care, pool care, newspaper delivery, or the like, 
the vendor attempts to induce the customer to stand by its earlier 
implicit promise of patronage and is normally eager to keep the 
relational and rolling contract in effect. 
Further, if the vendor has rendered continued services after 
payment has stopped, the vendor in theory has a cause of action for 
breach of contract or at least quantum meruit recovery, unless given 
adequate and timely notice by the customer that services were no longer 
required, just as the customer would have a claim against the vendor 
that failed to show up and provide promised services.123  In practice, 
such small claims are almost never brought because the logistical costs 
of enforcement exceed any real injury.  Vendors who deliver and are 
unpaid, however, usually at least bill the nonpaying customer and may 
even commence collection actions.124 
Where the policyholder announces a desire to end coverage rather 
than simply failing to pay newly billed premiums, the bilateralness of 
insurance contracts appears more pronounced.  For example, a 
policyholder on a six-month billing cycle for her automobile policy may 
call her agent during the third month and cancel coverage, planning to 
switch to a less expensive insurer.  As unilateral contract enthusiasts 
point out, the insurer cannot compel the policyholder to stay and 
commonly returns roughly half of the six-month premium paid some 
three months earlier.  This hardly means the cancelling policyholder, as 
one performing prior to the policy period, was free of obligations 
sounding in promise. 
In policy termination situations, the insurer usually refunds a 
portion of the previous premium payment—but only a portion.  The 
insurer regards the first three months’ premium as “earned” because the 
insurer assumed the risk, even if the policyholder had no auto-related 
mishaps.  The refunded half of the six-month premium is the “unearned 
premium.”125  In practical terms, the policyholder is not walking away 
 
 123 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 150 (citing Austin v. Burge, 137 S.W. 618 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1911)) (describing potential customer liability for continuing to receive services despite 
tardy or imperfectly expressed intent to cancel or reject).  The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 
subsequently made it an unfair trade practice to bill a recipient for unsolicited merchandise sent 
through the mail.  See id. (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009). 
 124 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Hello, Collections? The Worm Has Turned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2009, at 1 (describing creditor and law firm’s aggressive pursuit of the wrong person in 
connection with $919 credit card debt). 
 125 State laws vary as to whether and how insurers may use a short rate method to recalculate 
and retain more than a pro rata share of the unearned premiums when policyholders cancel 
prematurely.  LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 5 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 79:22 (Westlaw 
2010).  When permitted, a short rate refund works like a liquidated damages provision and allows 
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without any liability to the insurer but rather permissibly breaches the 
insurance contract and essentially pays liquidated damages126 based on 
an implicit out-of-pocket or restitution127 formula for the insurer.  The 
policyholder has no further obligation and can get a refund of unearned 
premium, but the earned premium remains with the insurer—and is 
considered earned by the insurer even though the policyholder has 
submitted no claims and the insurer has paid nothing (although it did 
incur sales and administrative costs).  The insurer also gained from 
having all premiums previously paid at its disposal for investment. 
In some states, however, insurers are not required to refund 
premiums on a pro-rata basis and may retain at least a portion of the 
unearned premium.  To the extent this occurs, the entire process looks 
even more like contract “breach” by the policyholder (ending the 
insurance policy earlier than promised) that leads to the imposition of a 
type of de facto liquidated damages as a result. 
If the insurance policy were purely unilateral or reverse-unilateral, 
the policyholder’s full “performance” through paying the premium 
would not logically lead to a withdrawal or repudiation of performance 
already delivered.  For example, in the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, 
performance by the offeree trekking the Bridge cannot be undone or 
reversed.  The same can be said of the flagpole climber in that famous 
hypothetical.  Although characterizing insurance policies as reverse-
unilateral arguably provides an explanation for this oddity, our view is 
that it provides a stronger argument that the insurance policy is better 
viewed as bilateral rather than as a mutated species of unilateral 
contract. 
The policyholder terminating coverage arguably forfeits or loses 
the premiums previously paid covering the three months for which the 
policyholder received nothing more than the insurer’s assurances that it 
would provide coverage if the need arose.  The better view, however, is 
that the policyholder did indeed get what it paid for during those three 
months—protection against contingent loss that the policyholder was 
fortunate enough not to have incurred during the time the policy was in 
 
the insurer to recalculate the premium based upon “‘the customary rates charged for insuring like 
property, in a like amount’” for a shorter term and return less than a pro rata calculation.  Home 
Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 128 S.W. 273, 274 (Mo. App. 1910); see also Amgro, Inc. v. Lincoln Gen. 
Ins. Co., 361 F. App’x 338 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing a New Jersey statute regarding short rate 
premium refund); Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Amco Mesh & Wire Co., 472 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. 
1971) (discussing insurance policy language providing for a short rate calculation when insured 
cancels prematurely).  Regarding premium refunds, see DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 187-88; 
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 122-26. 
 126 Liquidated damages are a sum stipulated within the contract as the damages for breach.  
The sum must be “reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and 
the difficulties of proof of loss.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). 
 127 Restitution damages are a sum of damages measured by “the benefit that has been 
conferred upon” the liable party.  Id. § 371 cmt. a. 
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effect.  Under either view, however, neither the policyholder nor the 
insurer gains because of any unilateral concept of the insurance policy.  
The policyholder could just as easily have promised regular payments 
and then stopped making payment, rather than paying the initial six 
months of premiums and then seeking a refund.  If anything, the latter 
arrangement is a boon to the insurer by providing it with capital that it 
would not otherwise have had if the policyholder had only promised to 
pay (rather than paid) at the outset. 
In theory, the insurer might be able to seek consequential damages 
when a policyholder breaches by cancellation.  However, under the 
classic common law approach of Hadley v. Baxendale and its 
progeny,128 this is unlikely in that the policyholder usually has no reason 
to know of any adverse consequences that will befall the insurer from 
cancellation.129  Further consequential damages are thus usually outside 
the contemplation of the parties and not recoverable.  If permitted by 
state regulators, however, insurers could probably structure the 
transaction to recover actual damages for early cancellation. 
Such damages provisions in policies or full-blown litigation over a 
prematurely terminated insurance policy seldom occur, not only because 
of the economics of litigation, but also because of prevailing insurer 
views regarding effective marketing and customer relations.  Insurers 
appear to have made the decision not to push the contract doctrine 
envelope and seek full compensation from policyholders who walk 
away from policies even though it would appear they could make non-
frivolous attempts to do so.  Instead, insurers appear content to let 
policyholders leave and to concentrate their efforts upon enlisting new 
customers rather than pursuing claims against those who leave. 
Characterization of the insurance policy as unilateral or reverse-
unilateral does not change this calculus or the options facing insurers 
and policyholders.  Even where premium payment is regarded as full 
performance, seeking a refund of premium after the insurer has 
promised coverage for a given time constitutes a breach of any such 
reverse-unilateral contract and, as discussed above, entitles the insurer 
to retain premium for the time when coverage was provided (and 
perhaps some of the unearned premium) even if the policyholder is 
allowed to end the arrangement earlier than expected.  But if a 
consumer insurer (e.g., an auto insurer such as State Farm) were to do 
more, such as retaining some of the unearned premium as an 
approximation of incidental or consequential damages or suing for such 
damages, the insurer would almost certainly reap significant adverse 
 
 128 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
 129 Consequential damages are “those which will not always result from a breach of contract 
of the character of the particular breach, but which did flow from this breach and were 
foreseeable.”  WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 66:57. 
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publicity.  Seldom will an insurer consider this detriment smaller than 
the expected value of a full-blown breach of contract claim against the 
policyholder who walks out early.  In the less public arena of surplus 
lines insurance, adverse publicity is less of a problem. 
Perhaps more important, most state insurance regulations require 
refunds of unearned premium, precluding the insurer from taking a 
tough approach to terminating policyholders even if it is convinced that 
this is a legally supportable and valid business proposition.  Insurance 
is, at least as compared to most contractual activity, heavily 
regulated.130  As a result, positive law may circumscribe insurer 
behavior, as well as policyholder or applicant behavior.  This aspect of 
insurance not only tends to make contract characterization issues less 
important than might otherwise be the case, but also makes insurance 
contracting and the operation of insurance something more than a 
purely contractual exercise.  The problems of policyholder cancellation 
and premium refund illustrate the degree to which the relentlessly 
unilateral view of insurance policies seems not to square with the actual 
insurer-policyholder relationship in practice. 
Insurance is not only publicly regulated, but also reflects a type of 
private ordering arrived at by the insurance industry131 which, because 
of exceptions to the antitrust laws, is permitted to collaborate to an 
extent not found in most other businesses.132  In addition, the highly 
standardized nature of insurance and the use of standardized policies as 
components of widely shared risk management goals by certain types of 
businesses and individuals makes insurance policies something akin to 
products rather than pure contracts.133  Moreover, the importance of 
insurance in achieving policy goals and fostering commerce makes it 
something of a social institution or instrument for effecting social 
policy.134  Although none of these different perspectives strip insurance 
policies of their core character as contracts, they make the 
unilateral/bilateral distinction and contract formation issues generally 
less important than in other areas of contract. 
In addition, because the insurer-policyholder relationship carries 
with it more significant obligations of good faith than found in the 
 
 130 See JERRY, supra note 82, at 69-78 (discussing the justifications for state regulation and the 
historical rise of comprehensive state regulation of insurance and the influence of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, 
§§ 2.03-2.05.  
 131 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 
(2010). 
 132 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).  
 133 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance 
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2006); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as 
Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009).  
 134 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010). 
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ordinary contract relationship, the insurer is logically restricted in its 
options in dealing with the policyholder in any way that may harm the 
policyholder.135  Because a “no harm, no foul” ethos and tradition 
dominates policyholder cancellation of policies, the issue has not been 
well tested.  One can make a compelling argument that an insurer with 
fiduciary-like duties to the policyholder acts in bad faith if it responds to 
the policyholder’s termination and request for a refund with undue 
efforts to hold the policyholder to the original arrangement or wrings 
from the policyholder every last cent in seeking full compensation of 
every arguable injury suffered by the insurer when the policyholder 
leaves.136  Good faith requires that the insurer give equal consideration 
to the policyholder’s interests as to those of the insurer,137 a standard 
that arguably precludes a scorched earth, retaliatory attitude toward 
customers who want to leave. 
 
 135 Every contract carries with it an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.38, at 412-17; 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 7.17.  However, outside of insurance, the duty has 
relatively modest scope and consequences.  For example, Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code governing sales defines good faith as mere “honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”  U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2010). 
  By contrast, an insurer’s duty of good faith toward a policyholder is fiduciary in nature or 
even fully fiduciary when the insurer is discharging its role of defense and settlement of liability 
claims against the policyholder.  Further, most jurisdictions treat an insurer’s breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tort and permit an aggrieved policyholder to pursue 
tort remedies (which are generally more expansive than contract remedies), including punitive 
damages.  See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 14.01; JERRY, supra note 82, § 25[G]; OSTRAGER 
& NEWMAN, supra note 3, §§ 12.01, 12.12; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, 
§10.01. 
 136 Good faith toward a policyholder generally requires that the insurer give the policyholder’s 
interest at least equal consideration to the insurer’s own interests and to refrain from sharp 
practices.  See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 14.01; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 3, § 
12.06, at 862; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 10.01.  Because an insurer 
cancelling a policy expects to terminate its responsibility for contingent liability or loss, the equal 
consideration principle logically suggests that the insurer facing a policyholder’s termination 
should happily refund unearned premium, irrespective of whether the insurance policy is viewed 
as a unilateral contract or a bilateral contract.  Selling insurance and collecting a premium in 
advance of acceptance of contingent risk but then refusing to refund unearned premium would 
permit the insurer to unfairly elevate its own interests above those of the policyholder.  It would 
also permit the insurer to take undue advantage of policyholders, particularly less sophisticated 
policyholders who have not thought through issues of policy termination and its consequences. 
  In addition, it should be noted that policy termination by the policyholder is often not the 
result of calculating behavior by the policyholder such as bargain-hunting among available 
insurance products.  For example, a policyholder may wish to terminate a policy and seek a 
premium refund because of a job transfer, sale of the insured assets, divorce, death, or other 
situations that have changed the policyholder’s risk management preferences since the time the 
policy was initially purchased. 
 137 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 10.01 (equal consideration 
standard for good faith by insurers); see also STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: 
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES §1.2, at 1-3 (2d ed. 2009) (essentially the same perspective in that the 
covenant of good faith requires “each party to refrain from doing anything that would injure the 
right of the other party to receive the benefits of the agreement”). 
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In addition, the degree of good faith required for insurance greatly 
exceeds that imposed on most contractual relations.  The insurer-
policyholder relationship is considered semi-fiduciary in all 
jurisdictions and fully fiduciary in most jurisdictions in the liability 
insurance context where the insurer has the right and duty to defend the 
policyholder in litigation and attempt to settle claims, particularly where 
there is risk that a resulting judgment could exceed policy limits. 
The existence of the substantial good faith duties that attach to 
insurance policies tends to undermine the unilateral characterization.  
On one hand, treating premium payment by the policyholder as full 
performance helps to support the idea that the policyholder is vulnerable 
and should not be deprived of the benefit of the bargain in receiving 
performance should the insured contingent events take place.  But more 
important, the good faith obligations of the insurer, combined with the 
duties of the policyholder after a claim or loss, tend to show that the 
relationship is ongoing rather than fully performed by premium 
payment or limited on the insurer’s part to mere execution of a simple 
task such as traversing a bridge, climbing a flagpole, or handing over an 
agreed sum. 
Once the insurer “accepts” the policyholder’s “offer” to buy 
insurance, gives “full performance” through premium payment, and the 
insurer issues the insurance policy, the resulting arrangement begins to 
look much more like a standard bilateral contract than a vendor paid in 
advance to cross the Brooklyn Bridge or shinny up a flagpole.  In 
addition to the policyholder’s implicit promise to continue paying 
premiums and to keep the policy in force, there remains, as discussed 
above, the strong possibility that the insurer will revise policy terms, 
either during the policy period or upon renewal.  Although there are 
some regulatory and case law constraints, insurers for the most part 
have substantial latitude to unilaterally amend the provisions of their 
policies, as do most commercial vendors dealing with consumers.138  In 
these other contexts, of course, the contracts involved (e.g., credit card 
accounts, utility services, banking accounts) are universally recognized 
as bilateral.  By contrast, as a theoretical matter, unilateral amendment 
of the terms should have no rule in unilateral contracts because, by 
definition, there has been no contract formed or the contract is formed 
and fully executed at the same moment.  Logically, then, the mere 
presence of unilateral amendment of contract terms suggests that the 
contract in question is not unilateral. 
As a matter of classification and nomenclature, any modification to 
the original offer to form a unilateral contract is not a change in terms, 
but a revision of the offer in question.  For example, in the classic 
 
 138 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 
57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 605 (2010). 
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agreed instances of unilateral contracts such as the Brooklyn Bridge 
hypothetical, the offeror’s sudden reduction of the promised payment 
yelled to the walker minutes before she reaches the end of the Bridge is 
not a change in contract terms (because the contract is as yet unformed), 
but is instead a revoked original offer, a revised offer, or a new offer.139  
Once it was agreed that the beginning of substantial performance by the 
walker precluded revocation of the offer,140 it also logically followed 
that the offeror could also not unilaterally alter the offer to the partial 
performer’s detriment.  But for insurance policies, we find unilateral 
amendment to be a constant.141 
If the insurance policy were truly unilateral or reverse-unilateral, 
full performance through premium payment would logically make such 
changes in terms ineffective unless they gave the policyholder greater 
protection than promised in the original deal.142  Unilateral amendments 
to contracts are generally justified by those who support them on the 
ground that the initial contract gave the vendor the right to such 
modification.  As Professor David Horton has shown, much of the 
rationale undergirding the legal system’s toleration of such unilateral 
amendment is faulty and a good case can be made for prohibiting such 
unilateral rewriting of contracts altogether.143  Regardless of one’s 
position on this issue, however, the presence of unilateral modification 
of insurance policy terms tends to suggest an ongoing and iterative 
relationship between policyholder and insurer, rather than the more 
simplified schematic advanced by a unilateral classification of the 
insurance policy and the parties’ relationship. 
Even where an insurer is not routinely making unilateral changes 
to policy terms, the insurer will at the very least offer the insurance at 
different (usually higher) premium prices during subsequent time 
 
 139 See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (describing unilateral contract theory and its 
application). 
 140 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing how the harshness of the original 
view that the offeror could revoke after the offeree began performance led to the consensus that 
substantial part performance created contract rights for the performing offeree). 
 141 Skeptical readers need only look at the inserts commonly included with premium billings 
from their insurers, which often contain a unilateral change in the terms of the policy.  Although 
the unilateral changes may not become operative until the next pay period (which provides the 
additional consideration and de facto acceptance of the new terms required in some states), the 
practical impact is a pure unilateral amendment.  This is because the typical insurance 
policyholder, particularly a consumer policyholder, routinely keeps paying the premium without 
reading the insert.  See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 134, at 
1502 n.38 (noting that consumers regularly pay insurance premium billings in a timely fashion, 
considering them to be second in importance only to monthly mortgage payments). 
 142 If the reverse-unilateral characterization were correct, then the insurer, having received full 
performance from the policyholder, would logically be powerless to change the terms of the 
agreement just as the person offering money in the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical could not 
unilaterally decide to pay less than the promised $100 after the offeree had already traversed the 
Bridge. 
 143 See Horton, supra note 138. 
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periods.  These offers are commonly accepted by policyholders who 
write new (and usually ongoing) premium checks, in effect accepting 
insurer offers seriatim over the years.  Rather than a one-time performer 
in a unilateral contract, the policyholder begins to look more like a 
regular customer at a local retailer such as a grocery store, returning to 
the store with regularity, but often paying a different price for slightly 
different products.144 
By offering to continue coverage and sending a bill, the insurer has 
engaged in nontrivial administrative costs.  When the policyholder pays, 
usually by check, the policyholder is in effect promising that the funds 
will clear and that the premium will be paid, as much as it is paying the 
premium.  The process at that point begins to look more like a series of 
bilateral contracts or a larger, more comprehensive relational contract in 
which mutual promises are exchanged rather than an act induced by 
promise or promise induced by an act. 
Perhaps more important, however, the policyholder will not reap 
any benefit from the insurer’s promise of payment in the event of loss 
unless the policyholder keeps several promises made as part of the 
insuring arrangement.  Consequently, it is inaccurate to assume—as 
have the unilateralists—that upon payment of the premium, the 
policyholder has no further obligations.  If the policyholder wants 
defense against liability claims or indemnity for loss, it will need to 
keep several promises contained in the insurance contract. 
The standard insurance policy lists these promises under the often 
misleading heading of “conditions” of the policy.  Under standard 
contract law, a condition is an event that must occur before a given 
contracting party is obligated to perform.145  Most obviously for 
insurance, there must be a covered (or at least a potentially covered) 
 
 144 Similarly, retail customers of this type may have fully performed common side agreements 
such as opening a preferred customer account entitling them to discounts on merchandise or the 
accrual of bonus points and coupons.  Traditionalists could argue that such arrangements are 
another form of unilateral contract, but this also seems incorrect because the retailer’s promised 
performance is so nebulous, consisting of whatever favors the retailer may wish to convey to its 
most loyal customers in order to retain their loyalty.  In theory, the customer could enroll in such 
a program, faithfully swipe his or her member card (or punch in a phone number at checkout) and 
never receive any benefit other than those available to other shoppers not enrolled in the program.  
Only market forces prompt the retailer to do anything for the loyal customer in the program.  This 
may make such contracts illusory, or perhaps not contracts at all.  But once again, characterizing 
them as unilateral adds little or nothing helpful to assessing such arrangements. 
 145 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.2, at 361; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.2.  
Historically, conditions were often divided into “conditions precedent”—those that must occur 
before there is any obligation to perform—and “conditions subsequent,” which will extinguish 
the duty to compensate for a breach after the breach has occurred.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 250 (1932).  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has abolished the terms and 
speaks only of “conditions.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 224 (1981).  However, 
courts and counsel continue to use the precedent and subsequent terminology.  CALAMARI ET AL., 
supra note 83, at 412-17; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.2. 
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event before the insurer is obligated to do anything other than collect 
premiums and maintain the paperwork required by the insuring 
arrangement.  In liability insurance, for example, there must first be a 
lawsuit against the policyholder.146  For property insurance, there must 
be damage to the property from a covered cause.147  For life insurance, 
the person whose life is insured must die.148  Similar conditions exist for 
disability insurance, health insurance, or more specialized lines such as 
political risk insurance, pollution abatement insurance, workers’ 
compensation insurance and so on.149  The need for a covered event 
constitutes a true condition precedent to receiving insurance coverage. 
In contrast, many of the “conditions” of common insurance 
policies are in reality promises the policyholder must keep in order to 
obtain the promised coverage.  Although the policyholder need not 
fulfill these promises in the sense that there is seldom liability imposed 
upon the policyholder for breach, in the actual operation of insurance, 
the policyholder that fails to satisfy conditions of a policy suffers 
through being unable to receive the insurance coverage it purchased in 
the past by “performing” through the payment of premium.  In this 
sense, a policyholder not only performs through the initial premium 
payment, but also makes multiple promises (disguised or mislabeled as 
conditions), just as in the most involved of bilateral contracts. 
The policyholder that fails to keep a promise embodied in the 
insurance policy’s conditions may be worse off than the typical bilateral 
contracting party.  Where the typical promise is breached or unfulfilled, 
a contracting party may avoid penalty if the failure to keep the promise 
is not material,150 or may have contract rights diminished 
proportionately.151  By contrast, the policyholder who fails to satisfy the 
conditions/promises of the policy may suffer total forfeiture of the 
contract benefits it purchased through prepayment and on which it 
 
 146 Regarding the operation of liability insurance generally, see JACK P. GIBSON ET AL., 
COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (1999); JERRY, supra note 82, § 65(C); STEMPEL ON 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, ch. 14. 
 147 Regarding the operation of property insurance generally, see JERRY, supra note 82, § 42; 
LINDA G. ROBINSON & JACK P. GIBSON, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE (1989). 
 148 Regarding the operation of life insurance generally, see JERRY, supra note 82, § 13[A](b); 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, ch. 18; LESTER W. ZARTMAN & WILLIAM 
H. PRICE, LIFE INSURANCE (2d ed. 2003). 
 149 See generally JERRY, supra note 82 (surveying insurance, generally, and types of 
insurance); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 4.01-4.08 (same). 
 150 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 241, 241 cmt. a (1981) (only a material 
breach terminates contract rights or permits a non-breaching party to avoid contract; an 
immaterial breach gives rise to a claim for damages but otherwise does not alter operation of 
contract). 
 151 See id.; id. cmts. b, c (even where a clear beach exists, a contract is not abrogated and a 
breaching party does not forfeit all contract rights unless a breach is sufficiently material; where a 
breach does not require forfeiture of contract rights, damages paid by the breaching party should 
be proportional to injury caused by the breach). 
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relied.152  Where the design of the insurance sought is to protect the 
policyholder from catastrophic loss or liability, the loss of insurance 
coverage becomes forfeiture on steroids. 
If a court adjudicating coverage takes a strict view of required 
compliance with conditions and finds substantial compliance 
insufficient and even immaterial breach to negate coverage, the 
punishment of the policyholder for failing to keep a promise is severe 
indeed.  Similarly, the insurer’s failure to keep a promise of providing 
coverage, if sufficiently unreasonable, may give rise to bad faith 
liability, and even punitive damages if the insurer’s unreasonable 
behavior was in willful or wanton disregard of policyholder rights.153  
Taking a functional perspective on the insurance policy—rather than 
formally labeling it unilateral and deeming the policyholder’s promises 
to be conditions simply because these promises are contained in a 
“conditions” section of the policy—suggests that the insurance policy 
operates more like a bilateral exchange of important promises with 
substantial consequences. 
Regarding the actual operation of many “conditions” as promises, 
consider the typical general liability policy.  Among the conditions of 
any liability policy is the requirement that the policyholder provide to 
the insurer reasonably timely notice of an incident, claim, or suit against 
the policyholder154 and that the insurer be provided with sufficient detail 
to investigate the matter155 so that it can, if required, assume defense of 
the matter and seek to settle the claim if this is a prudent course of 
action. 
Historically, late notice was regarded as the failure of a condition 
precedent that prevented the otherwise promised insurance coverage 
 
 152 See infra Part III.C; see, e.g., P.R. Mallory & Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 920 N.E.2d 736, 746-47 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (failure to comply with policy conditions precludes any recovery by 
policyholder irrespective of magnitude of non-compliance); Vitto v. Davis, 23 So. 3d 1048, 1052-
54 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (same).  To avoid such harsh results, courts, in addition to finding 
substantial satisfaction of a condition to be sufficient, have tended to treat many conditions as 
promises.  As such, they apply materiality analysis rather than the historical rule that conditions 
must be strictly satisfied to permit contractual recovery.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Richards 5 & 10 
Inc., 433 A.2d 888, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). 
 153 See JERRY, supra note 82, § 25[G](d)(2)-(3); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra 
note 3, §§ 10.01, 10.05.  
 154 The notice provision of a commercial general liability (CGL) policy usually requires the 
policyholder to give notice “as soon as practicable” of any accident or offence that may result in a 
claim and of any lawsuit brought against the policyholder.  See, e.g., Insurance Services Office 
(ISO), CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 2 (2003), reprinted in DONALD S. MALECKI & 
ARTHUR L. FLITNER, CGL, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY, app. I, at 10 (8th ed. 2005). 
 155 The notice provision of most policies provides that notice must include the date, time, and 
location of any “occurrence” giving rise to liability as well as names and addresses of injured 
persons or witnesses and the nature of the injury or damage.  See, e.g., ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part 
IV, Condition 2 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 154, app. I, at 10. 
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from becoming applicable.156  The modern rule (now established in 
roughly forty states) is that late notice prevents coverage only if the 
insurer has been prejudiced by the delay, usually with the insurer 
required to prove any asserted prejudice.157  However, if notice were a 
true condition precedent—something that both contractually and 
logically must happen as specified in the contract in order to trigger 
contractual obligations—the insurers who once won these battles over 
whether prejudice was necessary to use late notice as a defense would 
have continued winning.  Instead, from the 1970s forward, insurers have 
almost always lost these battles as jurisdiction after jurisdiction has 
embraced the “notice-prejudice” rule.  As most courts have acted to 
soften the traditional no-prejudice-required rule, they have implicitly 
recognized either that prompt notice is not a true condition precedent or 
that forfeiture of otherwise available coverage is too high a price to pay 
for failure to satisfy the condition. 
The modern judicial view of notice is indubitably correct.  It makes 
no sense to deprive the policyholder (who long before paid cash to the 
insurer that benefited from investing it) of insurance coverage just when 
the aleatory contingency arises.  The policyholder purchased insurance 
for just that purpose.  If law generally abhors a forfeiture, it surely must 
detest stripping a policyholder of promised insurance due to tardy notice 
if there has been no harm to the insurer.  Denying coverage in such 
circumstances gives the insurer an undeserved windfall and makes the 
insurance policy fail its intended purpose as well as its social and 
economic function. 
But despite the modern trend, courts occasionally continue to 
adhere to the historical rule, in part because of the formal logic that 
failure of a condition precedent leaves contract obligations untriggered.  
Although excessive formalism is hardly rare in cases involving bilateral 
contracts, classifying insurance policies as unilateral arguably 
contributes to these errors and impedes analysis, even in jurisdictions 
that appear at times to embrace the sensible functionalism and 
abhorrence of forfeiture reflected in the modern notice-prejudice rule.  
For example, in 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court embraced with 
vigor the historical rule that no prejudice to the insurer was required to 
sustain a late notice defense so long as the notice provisions of the 
 
 156 See P.R. Mallory & Co., 920 N.E.2d at 746-47 (traditional rule requiring strict compliance 
with prompt notice provisions of insurance policy or coverage was lost). 
 157 See RANDY J. MANILOFF & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES; EVERY STATE ch. 2 (forthcoming 2010) (noting that at least thirty-eight 
states have clear precedent requiring that there be prejudice to an insurer from late notice, with 
most placing the burden on the insurer to prove prejudice; only a handful of states clearly 
continue to follow the old majority rule finding even slight or unimportant delays in giving notice 
to preclude coverage); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 3, § 4.02(c)(2) (same); STEMPEL ON 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[I] (same).  
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policy were clearly denominated as a condition precedent to 
coverage.158  Talismanically intoning that “a condition precedent is still 
a condition precedent,”159 the court distinguished seemingly inconsistent 
case law, which had led federal courts applying Arkansas law to employ 
a notice-prejudice rule, on the ground that in cases requiring the insurer 
to show prejudice, the notice provisions of the policy “did not indicate 
that the giving of proper notice was a condition precedent to recovery” 
making it “proper to require that the insurance company show 
prejudice.”160 
Rather than viewing notice as a condition precedent to coverage, 
however, it makes at least as much sense to regard the policyholder as 
promising adequate notice (reasonably prompt, or at least without 
 
 158 See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Care Mgmt., No. 09-662, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 131 (Ark. Mar. 
4, 2010). 
  This court has applied the general rule, that where an insurance policy provides 
that the giving of notice of a loss, claim, or lawsuit is a condition precedent to 
recovery, the insured must strictly comply with the notice requirement, or risk 
forfeiting the right to recover from the insurance company.  The insurance company 
need not show that it was prejudiced by any delaying in or lack of notification.  
However, if the notice provision is not a condition precedent, the insured does not 
automatically forfeit the right to recover.  Instead, the insurance company must show 
that it was prejudiced by noncompliance with the terms of the policy.  The insurance 
company may be prejudiced if the delay in notice was unreasonable. 
Id. at *6. 
  The Care Management opinion has an almost childlike focus on the magic words condition 
precedent, as though it were the insurance law equivalent of “Open Sesame” or “Abracadabra.”  
Apparently, if the magic words are used in the policy labeling notice as a condition precedent, 
tardy notice justifies severe forfeiture even if there is no prejudice to the insurer.  However, if the 
notice requirement of a policy is not so labeled, notice can be eons late and the insurer must still 
demonstrate prejudice.  But the notice provisions of all insurance policies serve the same purpose 
and function regardless of how they are packaged or labeled.  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
elevates form over substance to an astonishing degree, an error that arguably was aided by the 
unilateral view of insurance policies and its tendency to treat conditions as absolute while 
bilateral contract breaches are usually fatal only if material. 
  The policyholder in Care Management was not particularly sympathetic.  It was accused of 
mistreating an elderly patient and, with no apparent excuse, waited a long time to notify its 
liability insurer.  The policyholder was sued in June 2006 but did not notify the insurer until 
September 2008, with the case scheduled for final hearing in October 2008.  Although the Court, 
hearing the matter pursuant to a certified question from the Eighth Circuit, did not address the 
issue of prejudice, the potential for a finding of prejudice from this sort of delay is obvious.  
Ruling against the policyholder on notice-prejudice grounds would have been a much more 
defensible resolution of a case where the bench may have viewed the policyholder as 
undeserving.  Instead, the Court embraced a jurisprudential approach that has been in decline for 
a half-century.  See id. (reaffirming approach of Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 82 S.W. 840 (Ark. 
1904)); see also id. at *6 n.1 (citing Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998)) 
(acknowledging that “many states are increasingly” adopting the notice-prejudice rule as though 
development of the issue had ceased in the twentieth century).  Nearly forty states have embraced 
the notice-prejudice rule, including longtime traditional rule state New York.  N.Y. INS. LAW § 
3420(a)(5) (McKinney 2010); MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 157. 
 159 See 2010 Ark. LEXIS 131 at *6 n.1. 
 160 See id. at *12.  In addition to embracing historical rule precedents dating from 1903, the 
Care Management court overruled Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benefield, 499 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 
1973), which appeared to adopt the notice-prejudice rule.  2010 Ark. LEXIS 131 at *13. 
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prejudicial delay) if it is to receive the promised coverage.  Material 
breach of the promise results in forfeiture of coverage.  Although not 
explicit, this view in effect recasts the “condition” as a promise and the 
contract as bilateral. 
Liability insurance policies also state that the policyholder must 
cooperate in the insurer’s defense of a claim.161  Property insurance 
imposes a similar requirement that the policyholder cooperate “in the 
investigation or settlement of a claim.”162  If the policyholder breaches 
this promise and fails to cooperate, coverage may be completely lost, 
even when it is uncontested that the loss or claim involved falls squarely 
within the scope of the insurance policy.  Although the cooperation 
requirements have often not been stringently enforced by courts and 
anything resembling substantial compliance is usually enough, the 
cooperation clause of insurance policies operates in practice as a 
promise by the policyholder in that it involves activity largely under the 
policyholder’s control.  Policyholder cooperation is not “an event, not 
certain to occur” (as set forth in the Restatement),163 but instead is a 
representation by the policyholder that it will assist the insurer in 
implementing the policy.  Where the policyholder is uncooperative, this 
looks more like breach of a promise than failure of a true condition. 
In liability insurance and in other types of insurance, the 
commercial policyholder also promises to submit to a “premium audit” 
in which the insurer checks the books of the policyholder (usually with 
the policyholder required or promising to submit data to the insurer) to 
determine if it has paid the required premium.  The premium is initially 
set based on underwriting criteria such as the policyholder’s number of 
employees, volume of business, etc. at the time the policy period began.  
It is recalibrated according to the actual experience of the policyholder 
during the time insured.164  Here the policyholder is indeed promising to 
permit the insurer to reassess the cost of insurance and promising to pay 
any funds that may be owed the insurer after the premium audit is 
concluded.165 
 
 161 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial General Liability Form, CG 00 01 10 01, Section IV, Condition 
2(c), reprinted in FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, app. E, at 13. 
 162 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition 3(a)(8) (2001), 
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONAL’S POLICY KIT: 
A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE INSURANCE FORMS 227 (2004). 
 163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 224 (1981) (defining “condition”). 
 164 Regarding premium audits and retroactive revision of premiums in light of the 
policyholder’s actual loss experience, see REJDA, supra note 2, at 612, 624 (retrospective rating 
means that “the insured’s loss experience during the current policy period determines the actual 
premium paid for that period.”); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 124 (“A deposit 
premium is charged at the inception of the policy and then adjusted after the policy period has 
expired, to reflect actual losses incurred.”); see also id. at 133-34 (illustrating application of 
retrospective rating formula). 
 165 A standard premium audit provision provides that the insurer “will compute all premiums 
for this Coverage part in accordance with our rules and rates” and that: 
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This aspect of insurance dramatically undercuts the contention of 
the unilateralists that the policyholder has satisfied its obligations 
through complete performance at the outset of the policy.  On the 
contrary, the policyholder has made a promise to pay additional 
premiums if necessary and does not satisfy this promise until much 
later, often after the conclusion of the policy period.  Unlike a 
policyholder’s decision to switch insurers and seek a refund of unearned 
premium, the commercial policyholder’s failure to pay adjusted 
premiums will in all likelihood lead to a collection action by the insurer 
for the additional amounts owed. 
Most important, however, the premium audit condition found in 
most commercial liability insurance policies (and in many commercial 
first-party policies as well) demonstrates that the policyholder is not 
performing the entirety of even its solely monetary contractual 
obligations to the insurer at the outset of the insurance relationship.  
Rather, the policyholder is making a promise regarding potentially 
adjusted premium payments in return for the insurer’s promise of 
coverage.  This alone makes the insurance policy contract more bilateral 
than unilateral.166 
Another common condition in insurance policies, both liability and 
property, commercial and personal, is the policyholder’s promise to 
cede to the insurer any legal rights it may have against persons causing 
injury or damage.167  These contractual subrogation clauses are 
 
Premium shown in this Coverage as advance premium is a deposit premium only.  At 
the close of each audit period we will compute the earned premium for that period and 
send notice to the [policyholder].  The due date for audit and retrospective premiums is 
the date shown as the due date on the bill.  If the sum of the advance and audit 
premiums paid for the policy is greater than the earned premium, we will return the 
excess to the [policyholder]. 
. . . . 
[The policyholder] must keep records of the information we need for premium 
computation, and send us copies at such times as we may request. 
ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 5 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 
154, app. I, at 11; see also ISO, Common Policy Conditions, IL 00 07 11 98, Condition C (1998), 
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 214 (“We may examine and 
audit your books and records as they relate to this policy at any time during the policy period and 
up to three years afterward.”). 
 166 See ISO, Common Policy Conditions, IL 00 07 11 98, Condition D (1998), reprinted in 
ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 214 (“We have the right to: a. Make 
inspections and surveys at any time; b. Give you reports on the conditions we find; and c. 
Recommend changes.”). 
 167 In the standard CGL policy, the provision reads: 
If the insured has rights to recover all or part of any payment we have made under this 
Coverage Part, those rights are transferred to us.  The insured must do nothing after 
loss to impair them.  At our request, the insured will bring “suit” or transfer those 
rights to use and help use enforce them. 
ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 8 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 
154, app. I, at 12. 
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promises by the policyholder both to let the insurer sue on its behalf for 
recompense of loss caused by others as well as a further promise to 
cooperate with the insurer in pursuing any such actions.  Once again, it 
appears that, far from just paying a premium and waiting, the 
policyholder has promised something of value to the insurer in return 
for the insurer’s valuable promise of coverage in the event of liability or 
loss. 
Other provisions of insurance policies tend to establish promissory 
obligations of the policyholder—at least if it wants to collect on the 
coverage it has purchased in the event of litigation or loss.  For 
example, liability policies often provide for a reduction in benefits paid 
by the policy to the extent there is other available insurance and usually 
attempt to require that other insurers pay before the instant insurer is 
responsible, typically establishing a manner of pro-rating available 
coverage from two or more insurance policies.168  Some liability and 
property policies go so far as to eviscerate coverage completely if there 
is other insurance covering the claim or loss.169  In these latter instances 
in particular, the policyholder is in essence promising that it will not 
purchase any additional insurance on the risk if it wishes to collect from 
the insurer.170 
 
  Subrogation arrangements are even more common in property insurance and may arise by 
operation of law even in the absence of specific policy language.  However, most property 
insurance policies expressly provide that the policyholder will permit the insurer to pursue such 
actions.  For example, the standard ISO Commercial Property policy provides: 
If any person or organization to or for whom we make payment under this Coverage 
Part has rights to recover damages from another, those rights are transferred to us to the 
extent of our payment.  That person or organization must do everything necessary to 
secure our rights and must do nothing after loss to impair them.  But you may waive 
your rights against another party in writing: 
 Prior to a loss to your Covered Property or Covered [Lost Business] Income [as a 
result of property loss]. 
 After a loss to your Covered Property or Covered Income only if, at the time of 
loss, that party is one of the following: Someone insured by this insurance; A business 
firm: Owned or controlled by you; or That owns or controls you; or Your tenant. 
ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 90 07 88, Condition I (1987), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF 
AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 216. 
 168 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 13.02, 13.03; ISO, CG 00 01 
12 04, Part IV, Condition 4 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 154, app. I, at 
12. 
 169 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 13.02, 13.03 (discussing 
application of such “escape” clauses that, if enforced literally, relieve insurer of coverage 
obligation if there is any other applicable insurance covering the risk). 
 170 One of the authors regards at least some of the exclusions within a policy as containing 
implicit promises to refrain from those behaviors.  For example, a policyholder’s de facto 
executory promise required for insurability is provided by a core exclusion found in liability 
policies that provides that there is no coverage for injury that is “expected or intended” by the 
policyholder.  See, e.g., ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 4 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI 
& FLITNER, supra note 154, app. I, at 2 (“This insurance does not apply to” bodily injury or 
property damage “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”) (providing an 
exception to the exclusion where bodily injury results “from the use of reasonable force to protect 
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Property insurance policies often contain other “loss conditions” 
that are in practical terms promises obligating the policyholder and 
providing that if the promise is breached, there will be reduced coverage 
or loss of coverage.  In a typical property policy, for example, the 
policyholder is required to take reasonable action to preserve the 
property after loss and prevent losses from exacerbating due to neglect, 
exposure to the elements, looting, vandalism, and the like.171  The 
policyholder must also provide as requested a “complete inventory of 
the damaged and undamaged property, includ[ing] quantities, costs, 
values and amount of loss claimed,”172 as well as submit a signed, 
sworn proof of loss to the insurer within a specified time.173  The 
policyholder also promises to permit the insurer to “inspect the property 
 
persons or property”).  This exclusion is generally described as one that gives definition to the 
concept that insurance covers only fortuitous loss rather than intentionally caused loss.  See 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 1.06.  However, it can also be viewed as a 
promise that the policyholder will not intentionally injure others or engage in activity 
substantially certain to cause such injury if it is to receive liability coverage.  Breach of this 
promise through intentionally inflicted injury to a third party prevents coverage under the liability 
policy. 
  Likewise, first party insurance will not pay for claims that are the result of a policyholder’s 
intentional desire to bring about the loss through misbehavior such as arson, staged auto wrecks, 
self-inflicted wounds (for fraudulent disability or workers compensation claims), or murder (of a 
person insured by a beneficiary or where the policyholder is someone other than the person 
whose life is insured).  STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 1.06[A].  These 
sorts of “Double Indemnity” (DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944)) or “Body Heat” 
(BODY HEAT (Warner Bros. 1981)) style murders for insurance are proscribed by law, public 
policy, and morality.  But, one might also view these restrictions on insurance coverage as 
implicit promises made by the policyholder, or others, to refrain from certain improper behavior 
where breach of the promise, if detected, is treated as inherently material and results in 
withdrawal of insurance benefits that would have otherwise been available in the event of loss.  
For insurance, as with any bilateral contract, substantial breach of a policyholder’s promises in 
the agreement itself and failure to conform to overarching legal and ethical rules can result in 
forfeiture of contract benefits. 
  In addition, many of the exclusions listed in an insurance policy can be viewed as not only 
attempts to reduce and tailor the coverage provided in the insuring agreement, but also as 
promises by the policyholder that it will not engage in certain activity in return for receiving 
coverage.  For example, a life insurance policy typically excludes coverage for suicide during the 
first two years the policy is in effect and also excludes coverage for death due to war.  More 
particularized life insurance policies may also exclude coverage for death resulting from 
skydiving, spelunking, or other high risk activities.  To the extent that the policyholder has some 
control over whether it enters into such activities, the policyholder is, in effect, promising not to 
commit suicide, enlist, skydive, explore caves, and the like if it wishes to collect life insurance 
benefits. 
 171 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition 3(a)(4) (2001), 
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 226 (“Duties In the Event of 
Loss or Damage” include requiring policyholder to “[t]ake all reasonable steps to protect the 
Covered Property from further damage and keep a record of your expenses necessary to protect 
the Covered Property.”  In addition, the policyholder should “if feasible, set the damaged 
property aside and in the best possible order for examination.”). 
 172 See, e.g., id. at 226 (Loss Condition 3(a)(5)). 
 173 See, e.g., id. at 227 (Loss Condition 3(a)(7); policyholder must send insurer proof of loss 
within sixty days of insurer’s request). 
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proving the loss or damage and examine [the policyholder’s] books and 
records.”174  Property insurance coverage is also typically restricted, 
suspended or unavailable when the insured property is “vacant,” as 
defined in the policy,175 for more than a specified period of time, 
typically sixty days.176 
Property policies patterned after marine insurance also may include 
a “sue and labor” clause, which provides that the policyholder will 
make reasonable efforts to prevent future related losses and to minimize 
the damage wrought by a covered peril.177  For example, if a vessel’s 
hull is damaged and develops a leak, the policyholder should attempt to 
save as much cargo as possible by relocating it away from the source of 
water intrusion and may be required to effect repairs at sea or to put into 
the nearest port rather than continuing to sail and permitting additional 
damage to cargo. 
In addition, property insurance typically has a “co-insurance” 
clause that requires the policyholder to insure property at eighty percent 
of its value.178  Failure to do so results in a proportionate reduction of 
insurance payments after loss.179  The policyholder’s promise to meet 
the co-insurance clause and “insure to value” on the property is one 
where breach does not typically result in litigation against the 
policyholder by the insurer, but often results in the insurer imposing its 
own brand of liquidated damages by reducing coverage payments after 
loss. 
Property insurance policies also may void coverage or provide for 
a retroactive premium increase in the event of loss if there is an 
“increase” of the “hazard” posed to the insurer in covering the property 
or a heightened risk of loss due to a change in use of the property.180  
For example, if a farm is turned into a factory, the insurer originally 
underwriting the property as a farm can rightfully claim that the change 
in function logically abrogates the insuring arrangement.  Alternatively, 
the insurer can argue that the change in use at least requires that the 
policyholder pay premiums commensurate with the risks posed by a 
 
 174 See, e.g., id. at 226-27 (Loss Condition 3(a)(6)). 
 175 See, e.g., id. at 227-28 (Loss Condition 6). 
 176 See, e.g., id. at 228 (Loss Condition 6(b); where building “vacant for more than 60 
consecutive days” insurer will “not pay for any loss or damage caused by . . . Vandalism; 
Sprinkler leakage; Building glass breakage; Water damage; Theft; or Attempted Theft” and all 
other payments for covered causes of loss will be reduced by fifteen percent). 
 177 Regarding the sue and labor concept, see generally STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, 
supra note 3, § 15.05. 
 178 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition F1 (2001), 
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 228-29. 
 179 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.03. 
 180 See id. §§ 8.03, 15.01[A] (discussing coinsurance generally and coinsurance in property 
insurance, which should not be confused with the co-pay or coinsurance provisions of health 
insurance policies or plans). 
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factory (rather than the generally less liability-producing farm) if 
coverage is to remain in force. 
Insurance policies also typically contain a condition in which the 
policyholder essentially agrees that it may not assign the insurance 
policy to a third party, including a successor company, without the 
insurer’s consent.181  Such clauses are usually enforced by courts, at 
least with respect to contingent risks.182  In this way, the insurance 
policy differs from most contracts, where assignment of contract rights 
and delegation of duties is rather freely permitted in the interest of 
freedom of contract and economic efficiency provided that this does not 
increase the risk of breach or nonperformance to the other party. 
Like the increase of hazard provision, this aspect of insurance 
attempts to prevent the original policyholder from providing insurance 
to another, riskier potential policyholder that the insurer has not had the 
opportunity to investigate and underwrite.  The potential unfair 
forfeiture risks of strict enforcement of this language is softened by the 
general rule that, while insurance on a contingent risk may not be 
assigned without insurer consent, assignment of rights under a policy 
after the occurrence of the contingent events is permitted 
notwithstanding policy language.183  However, insurers have had 
significant recent success in invoking the anti-assignment clause and 
principle to avoid coverage in matters of complex corporate 
succession.184 
As with other “pseudo-conditions” in insurance policies, breach of 
an increase-of-hazard clause or an anti-assignment clause in a policy 
seldom, if ever, results in suit against the breaching policyholder (save 
for a possible declaratory judgment action to rescind the policy). 
However, breach of one of these clauses effectively places the 
policyholder in breach of the policy and imposes upon it the liquidated 
damages of no coverage, even though liability or loss facing the 
policyholder would otherwise fall within the scope of an insurance 
policy’s coverage. 
 
 181 See, e.g., ISO, Common Policy Conditions:  
Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without our written 
consent except in the case of death of an individual named insured.  If you die, your 
rights and duties will be transferred to your legal representative but only while acting 
within the scope of duties as your legal representative. 
ISO, Common Policy Conditions, IL 00 07 11 98, Condition F (1998), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF 
AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 214. 
 182 Even a church’s attempt to assign its insurance policy to another church is usually barred 
by anti-assignment clauses.  See Christ Gospel Temple v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 660 
(Pa. Super. Ct.  1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980). 
 183 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.15. 
 184 See Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003); Glidden Co. 
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 861 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 2006); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.15. 
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A typical property policy also requires that the policyholder submit 
to dispute resolution by appraisal in the event of a valuation 
controversy.  Property and other insurance policies may also require that 
the policyholder agree to arbitration or mediation of coverage disputes 
or may bind the policyholder to selected forums or jurisdictions in 
pursuing resolution of coverage disputes.  Property policyholders also 
commonly agree to allow examination under oath regarding the 
circumstances of a loss if the insurer desires.185 
In addition to largely ignoring many of the particular features of 
insurance policies and the operation of insurance products in the 
marketplace, scholarly discussion of unilateral and bilateral contracts 
has also largely overlooked the aleatory nature of insurance policies.  
An aleatory contract is distinguished from a commutative contract in 
that the latter involves exchange of consideration of equal value, while, 
in the former, the contracting parties accept at the outset that the dollar 
value of their exchange may not be equal due to the contingent nature of 
the risks accepted and coverage provided.186  Insurance is aleatory in 
that the arrangement between policyholder and insurer is often one of 
unequal exchange.  If the policyholder pays premiums for years and 
suffers no significant loss, the insurer effectively received much more 
than the policyholder (notwithstanding the well-established nostrum that 
with insurance, the policyholder is purchasing peace of mind).  
Conversely, if the policyholder holds a policy for only two months and 
then incurs a house fire, auto collision bills or liability, or suffers 
disease or disability, the insurer will surely pay far more than it has 
collected in premiums from the policyholder.  Although insurance 
differs significantly from gambling, there are surely elements of 
gambling in the risk transfer and distribution of insurance.187 
By contrast, in nearly all other contracts, the exchange between the 
parties is essentially equivalent, at least as measured by the parties’ own 
valuation of the items involved in the contract.  If a homebuyer pays the 
prevailing local market price to a seller for a three-bedroom rambler, 
lawyers and economists largely see the contract as one of equal 
exchange.  The buyer gets what it paid for, measured relatively 
objectively by the market for home sales in the vicinity.  Even where a 
 
 185 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Policy:  
We may examine any insured under oath while not in the presence of any other insured 
and at such times as may be reasonably required, about any matter relating to this 
insurance or the claim, including an insured’s books and records.  In the event of an 
examination, an insured’s answers must be signed. 
ISO, Commercial Property Policy, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition E.3.b., reprinted in ALLIANCE 
OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 227. 
 186 See DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 163; REJDA, supra note 2, at 99; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, 
supra note 2, at 168. 
 187 See DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 163; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 168. 
STEMPEL.32-1.DOC 9/7/10  9:44 PM 
2010]      M ISCLASSIFYING THE INSURANCE POLICY  133 
purchaser pays what others might consider an outrageous price for an 
item, economists regard the exchange as equivalent because of the 
incommensurability of respective parties’ valuations of goods, services, 
and promises.  One may think a portrait or piece of sculpture ugly and 
worthless, but if another patron finds the work breathtaking and pays 
$100,000 for it, the buyer has received something worth $100,000, at 
least to the buyer.188 
For aleatory contracts such as insurance, there is unequal exchange 
because the respective final monetary outcomes of the arrangement are 
unknown at the time of contracting.189  Consequently, the promise made 
by the insurer is dramatically more contingent than that made by most 
contracting parties and of much more attenuated value to the 
“performing” (through premium payment) policyholder.  For certain 
types of insurance policies, the possibility of performance may be so 
unlikely as to make coverage “illusory” or the arrangement 
unconscionable, such as when disability coverage attaches only if the 
policyholder cannot work at all and only after social security or other 
benefits have been exhausted.190  Even in less extreme circumstances, 
an insurer’s promise of coverage may realistically be quite modest 
where the “small print” in a policy takes away that which the “large 
print” appears to have promised in return for the policyholder’s 
premium payment/performance. 
Insurance policy sales thus appear quite distinct from the classic 
types of unilateral contracts.  In insurance, as opposed to the famous 
Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, the offeror takes considerable risk by 
both prepaying for an aleatory contract and relying on a promisor who 
may not fulfill the promise under circumstances where the offeror has 
little leverage over the promisor.  In addition, the policyholder cannot 
revoke its offer readily, the insurer has substantial ability to shorten the 
 
 188 In addition, purchasing decisions can be motivated by factors other than the buyer’s 
evaluation of the product itself.  See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL 41-45, 70-71 (2008) 
(describing an instance where the “villain,” a wealthy corporate executive attempting to alter the 
composition of a state supreme court to avoid environmental liability, pays several million dollars 
at a charity auction for a piece of avant garde sculpture that he hates but that his wife covets for 
the prestige the purchase will bring). 
 189 The psychic reassurance or “peace of mind” obtained by the policyholder, through having 
insurance in place that promises to respond to contingent losses, could conceivably serve the 
same purpose as idiosyncratic artwork and make insurance non-aleatory for the policyholder who 
pays high premiums for years and never suffers loss or liability.  Notwithstanding the general rule 
of incommensurability of value between persons, legal scholars and the insurance community 
generally accept that insurance contracts often do not involve equal exchange.  See, e.g., Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three 
Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 471-72 (2005). 
 190 See, e.g., discussion and case excerpts in ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 391-420.  Regarding 
the concept of insurance coverage as illusory generally, see Beth Skillern & Linda M. Bolduan, 
Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims: Real or Illusory? (ALI-ABA Course of 
Study, Nov. 13, 1997), WL SB96 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 87. 
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window for revocation (e.g., by cashing the premium check and issuing 
a binder or conditional receipt), and where later withdrawal by the 
policyholder results in only a partial refund of premiums by an insurer 
that earned investment income in the interim and, in the vast majority of 
cases, was not required to do anything of substance for the policyholder.  
At least the offeror in Professor Wormser’s famous Brooklyn Bridge 
hypothetical had the advantage of watching the other party trek across 
the famous Bridge and even (prior to the Restatement) had the 
opportunity to harass the other party through last minute revocation. 
Other classic unilateral contract situations also seem far afield from 
insurance.  Although insurance has aspects of gambling, the 
policyholder is not “rewarded” if it suffers a liability or loss event as are 
the performers in the reward, contest, or prize cases of unilateral 
contract lore.191  Even a suffering performer such as Mrs. Carlill of 
Carbolic Smoke Ball fame, who contracted influenza despite assurances 
otherwise, was not a victim of fate to the degree found with most 
policyholders suffering loss or liability.192  She gambled on the efficacy 
of the device and was disappointed, but had not relied on the smoke ball 
to indemnify or protect her from catastrophic loss. 
Likewise, performing brokers in those unilateral contract cases 
take on the credit and collection risks that sellers or buyers will attempt 
to avoid payment, a risk quite different from depending on the 
promising party to cover a risk the performer cannot shoulder itself.  
Similarly, employees seeking to enforce employer promises as a result 
of continuing to work,193 although sympathetic, still probably have more 
economic options than a policyholder who has lost a house or faces 
major litigation liability.  Those claiming government entitlements 
under unilateral contract theory194 may be so close to the edge that 
unfair payment denials are similarly devastating,195 but the government 
 
 191 See Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978) (affirming judgment for plaintiff 
who scored a hole-in-one in a golf tournament where defendant delearship had donated an 
automobile as a prize for holes-in-one—also much better than insured event, no matter how bad 
the weather or how mediocre the golf course outing); Lefkowtiz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus 
Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957) (finding a valid contract based on a retail advertisement 
that promised the first customer to arrive at a store a one dollar fur coat—which, to everyone but 
hardcore PETA members, certainly beats a home fire, lawsuit, hospitalization, disability, or 
death). 
 192 See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (Ct. App.) (U.K.), which is 
reprinted in nearly every contracts casebook; see also BARNETT, supra note 3, at 350-52 
(providing additional background information on Carlill and noting that the active ingredient in 
the smoke ball appears to have been a carcinogen). 
 193 See Pettit, supra note 4, at 559-67. 
 194 See id. at 570-73, 589-91. 
 195 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding recipient of public assistance 
benefits is entitled to due process before subsistence level benefits may be terminated, including 
adequate notice, explanation of government action, and determination by a sufficiently neutral 
government officer). 
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benefit sought, although important, is often not of such life-and-death 
magnitude. 
More important, in all these other cases arguably involving 
unilateral contracts, the party seeking compensation (be it promisor or 
performer) is engaged in a commutative contract of equal exchange of 
value, rather than depending on another promisor or performer who may 
forsake them when they are unable to obtain substitute performance and 
who may profit handsomely as a result of good luck effectively 
releasing it from its aleatory obligations. 
In sum, the insurance policy is simply quite different than other 
arrangements viewed as unilateral contracts, a difference that cannot be 
effectively explained away by deeming insurance to be a reverse-
unilateral contract.  Insurance policyholders appear to promise 
substantially more than appears to have been appreciated by those 
promoting the unilateral characterization of insurance policies.  The 
promising insurer also often has performance obligations due to 
regulation and the duty of good faith.  Further, the insurer is allowed to 
give highly contingent promises and, through adequate risk pooling, 
exploit the aleatory nature of the insurance policy.  As a result of these 
factors, characterizing the insurance contract as unilateral appears not to 
be an accurate assessment, notwithstanding that most judicial precedent, 
formed by early-twentieth century academic assessments, does not 
square with traditional contract interpretation.  Unfortunately, as 
discussed in Part III.C below, classification of insurance policies as 
unilateral is not a purely academic exercise, but has largely negative 
ripple effects in the real world of coverage litigation. 
 
C.     Impact Concerns: Ways in Which the Detriments of the Unilateral 
Characterization Exceed Purported Benefits 
 
As discussed above, we find the legal profession’s historic fixation 
on unilateral and bilateral contracts misguided and view the traditional 
unilateral (or reverse-unilateral) label inaccurate as applied to insurance, 
which we regard as primarily bilateral in nature.  The unilateral 
characterization of insurance policies not only errs as a matter of 
classification, but also has important intellectual, doctrinal, and practice 
consequences.  Several practical effects flow from characterizing the 
insurance contract as unilateral.  First, as outlined in Parts III.A and 
III.B above, the unilateral characterization fails to appreciate the 
nuances and actual operation of insurance and errs in failing to 
appreciate the degree to which the insurer-policyholder relationship is 
indeed promissory.  Second, any presumption that an insurance contract 
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is unilateral196 rather than bilateral conflicts with the overarching 
contracts Grundnorm that, wherever possible, contracts should be 
construed as bilateral in order to afford more protection to the parties.197 
Third, characterizing insurance contracts as unilateral results in an 
impoverished conception of the respective responsibilities of 
policyholders and insurers.  By pretending that policyholders make no 
promises to insurers and instead describing everything the policyholder 
must do under the contract as a condition rather than a promise,198 the 
traditional view impedes application of the rich complexities of the 
concepts of good faith, substantial performance, and material breach.  
Depending on the circumstances, these errors of analysis may unfairly 
impact either policyholders or insurers.  Courts that take a strict view on 
compliance with conditions may impose unfair forfeiture on the 
policyholder.  Other courts spend inordinate amounts of energy 
attempting to soften the harshness of the law’s historic all-or-nothing 
approach to conditions and the draconian effects of strict compliance 
and forfeiture, an endeavor that sometimes assists policyholders even to 
the detriment of insurers. 
Fourth, the characterization of insurance as a unilateral contract 
has limited the application of anticipatory repudiation, a doctrine that 
allows parties to restore a contractual relationship or move on.  The 
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation has been traditionally inapplicable 
to contracts that are fully executed on one side.199  Courts that follow 
this rule and presume that the insurance contract is unilateral leave 
 
 196 See, e.g., Winters v. State Farm & Fire Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Okla. 
1999); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 1998) (“Customarily, all 
forms of insurance are presumed to be unilateral contracts.”); see also Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 
354 F.3d 568, 600 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a director and officer liability policy is 
unilateral and characterizing all insurance policies as generally unilateral). 
 197 The Restatement (First) of Contracts expressed the view that bilateral construction was 
preferred.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 31 (1932).  The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts abandoned the language of unilateral and bilateral contracts, but retains a preference 
for the mutuality of a bilateral formation.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62 
(1981) (providing that where an offeree may accept by performance or promise, the tender of the 
beginning or beginning of the performance operates as a promise, thus favoring a bilateral 
construction). 
  Case law continues to express a preference for bilateral contracts.  See, e.g., Fosson v. 
Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (rebuttable presumption that 
contract is bilateral); Motel Servs., Inc. v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 394 A.2d 786, 788 (Me. 1978) 
(“contracts are presumed to be bilateral”); Rode Oil Co. v. Lamar Adver. Co., No. W2007-02017-
COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4367300, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (collecting citations and 
stating “we note that many authorities speak of a long-established presumption against finding a 
unilateral rather than a bilateral contract where there is doubt as to which type of contract was 
intended”). 
 198 See Winters, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 845 (insured’s undertakings are conditions of coverage, not 
affirmative promises). 
 199 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.18, at 532. 
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policyholders with inadequate remedies for an insurer’s prospective 
repudiation.200 
Fifth, characterization of an insurance contract as unilateral focuses 
too much attention upon the act of paying the premium. 201  In fact, as 
outlined above, policyholders often make and insurers often accept 
promises to pay premiums,202 partial payments with implied promises to 
pay more later, and financed payments.203  By labeling the act of paying 
the premium as the sine qua non of formation, courts are unnecessarily 
forced to agonize over lost mail, dishonored checks, and all the other 
potential payment glitches that might mean forfeiture of coverage.  The 
machinations courts must use to pigeonhole these contracts into a 
unilateral construction ignores the complicated courtship of offer and 
acceptance and the promises exchanged between policyholders and 
insurers within a complex, ongoing relationship. 
 
1.     The Destructive Force of Construing Policyholder  
Duties as Conditions 
 
By definition, only one party in a unilateral contract makes a 
promise.204  In a unilateral insurance contract, the insurer is regarded as 
the only promising party.  “Because a ‘unilateral contract’ is one in 
which no promisor receives promise as consideration for his promise, 
only one party is bound.”205  Thus, in a consummated insurance 
contract, only the insurer is bound to the insured; the policyholder has 
 
 200 See WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 63:63 (discussing divided approaches to application of 
anticipatory repudiation for an insurer’s prospective repudiation). 
 201 See Warren v. Confederation Life Ass’n, 401 F.2d 487, 489 (1st Cir. 1968) (“A life 
insurance policy is a unilateral contract—the applicant may pay the premium, or not, as he 
chooses; he is under no legal obligation to do so.”); La Salle Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Thompson, 
Gen. No. 7,712, 1927 WL 4140, at *3 (Ill. App. Sep. 24, 1927) (“[T]here was no promise to pay 
on the part of the member or nothing which could be tortured into an undertaking on the part of 
the member to pay for any definite length of time; that the whole scheme of insurance is based on 
a contract purely unilateral and whether the payment for insurance be termed a premium or an 
assessment, the right of the association or company is to declare a forfeiture for nonpayment of 
premium or assessment and not a right to recover the assessment or premium in a suit; that a 
contract for insurance in any benevolent association is a unilateral contract and the member’s 
failure to pay is his declaration of severance and that the forfeiture as provided in the by-laws was 
self-executing and the member, without any action on the part of the association, by mere force of 
his failure to pay . . . ceased to be a member.”); Gibson v. Megrew, 56 N.E. 674 (Ind. 1900) 
(holding that as a unilateral contract, failure to pay a premium is not an indebtedness, but failure 
of a condition precedent and a forfeiture of the contract). 
 202 See Kelly v. Great W. Accident Ins. Co., 189 P. 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920) (insured 
promised to pay for life insurance annually for a term of five years). 
 203 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Doerr, 115 N.E. 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 1917) (insured paid with a 
promissory note). 
 204 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 56-57 (in a unilateral contract, “only one party has 
made a promise and therefore only this party is subject to a legal obligation”). 
 205 S. Trust Bank v. Williams, 775 So.2d 184, 188 (Ala. 2000). 
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completely performed by paying the premium and may now unilaterally 
walk away without breach simply by failing to renew or even by 
terminating the policy and seeking a refund of unearned premium.  In 
this section, we discuss two negative effects that result from construing 
the policyholder’s obligations as conditions.  The first is that a failure of 
a condition will result in forfeiture unless the court intervenes with a 
judicially established anti-forfeiture device, such as the requirement in 
most states that the insurer establish prejudice from failure to satisfy the 
condition of prompt notice.206  The second is that, by construing the 
policyholder’s obligations as conditions, the law asks too little of the 
policyholder and diminishes the relational aspects of the contract. 
If it is true that the policyholder has completely performed simply 
by paying the premium, then anything the policyholder does or fails to 
do during the policy period is not a breach of the insurance contract 
because the policyholder did not promise to do or refrain from doing 
anything.  Yet during the life of an insurance contract, its provisions 
seem to provide that the policyholder is expected to “do” quite a bit, 
including such things as providing notice of claims, proof of loss, and 
giving cooperation to the insurer.207 
If the policyholder is not “bound” by the contract and has made no 
promises, the only alternative is to label the policyholder’s enumerated 
responsibilities in the insurance contract as conditions.208  “The 
difference is not only one of semantics but also of substance; it 
determines the rights and responsibilities of the parties. . . .”209  
Constructing the policyholder’s return obligations as conditions 
deprives courts of material breach and substantial performance as tools 
to forgive trivial breaches. 
Conditions traditionally demand “strict compliance,” and the 
failure to strictly comply with a condition extinguishes any promissory 
duty on the other side.210  Simply put, failure to comply with a condition 
 
 206 See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing law of late notice and 
importance of judicial attitudes toward conditions in shaping that law). 
 207 Winters v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Okla. 1999) 
(“‘[D]espite the many acts to be done by the insured under a fire policy, the fire contract is a 
unilateral contract.’” (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 
1998))).  Some of the insureds’ undertakings include paying premiums, providing notice of 
claims, cooperating in documenting claims, and in the case of liability insurance, assisting in the 
defense of the claims. 
 208 Id. at 842.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a condition as “an event, not 
certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance 
under a contract becomes due.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981). 
 209 Williams, 775 So.2d at 188. 
 210 Professor Farnsworth explains the consequences of characterizing a term as a condition: “If 
the occurrence of a condition is required by the agreement of the parties, rather than as a matter of 
law, a rule of strict compliance traditionally applies.”  FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, 
§ 8.3, at 422-23.  In addition, the entire contract is imperiled when a condition does not occur: 
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will result in forfeiture of the benefits under the contract.  In the 
insurance context, this means that when a policyholder does not strictly 
comply with the insured’s duties, such as notice and cooperation, the 
policyholder puts both the premiums paid and the coverage promised at 
risk.211 
Faced with the harsh consequence of forfeiture, courts frequently 
strain to apply anti-forfeiture tools excessively and sometimes without a 
principled framework.  In the context of insurance conditions, judicial 
devices to avoid forfeiture have seemingly swallowed the rule that 
conditions must be strictly met.212  Courts employ a variety of equitable 
doctrines to overcome the harsh consequence of forfeiture—indulging 
waiver or estoppel analysis213—by requiring some showing of prejudice 
before allowing forfeiture.214  Even courts that do not adopt a prejudice 
rule can use other tricks to avoid forfeiture, such as generously 
permitting excuses215 or prolonging the time of reasonableness.216  Of 
 
The nonoccurrence of a condition of an obligor’s duty may have two distinct effects.  
First, the obligor is entitled to suspend performance on the ground that the performance 
is not due as long as the condition has not occurred.  Second, if a time comes when it is 
too late for the condition to occur, the obligor is entitled to treat its duty as discharged 
and the contract as terminated. 
Id. at 421. 
 211 Then-Judge Cardozo explained: 
Cooperation with the insurer is one of the conditions of the policy.  When the condition 
was broken, the policy was at an end, if the insurer so elected.  The case is not one of 
the breach of a mere covenant, where the consequences may vary with fluctuations of 
the damage.  There has been a failure to fulfill a condition upon which obligation is 
dependent. 
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 160 N.E. 367, 369 (N.Y. 1928). 
 212 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[B], at 9-10 (Supp. 2008) 
(“The word ‘reasonable’ rings throughout so much of this and other formulations of the duty as to 
suggest a tautology.  It is a concept and doctrine rooted in common sense but one nonetheless 
surrounded by inconsistent and sometimes unfair judicial results.”). 
 213 JERRY, supra note 82, at 192 (observing that waiver and estoppel can prevent insurers from 
enforcing a timely notice provision); see also PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.29, at 397-98. 
 214 JERRY, supra note 82, at 635 (“Under the modern view, late notice does not discharge the 
insurer’s duties unless the insurer is prejudiced as a result of the late notice.”). 
 215 See 13 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 125, § 186.5 (discussing the historical 
development of notice and proof of loss requirements). 
In addition, where the consequences of late notice are substantial and where the insurer 
need not show prejudice, courts in New York have provided that notice that is 
chronologically late may nonetheless be excused under appropriate circumstances so 
that late notice will not defeat coverage.  A valid excuse makes the notice timely in 
terms of legal effect . . . . 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[B], at 9-12 (footnotes omitted). 
 216 According to one treatise: 
There exists a wide range as to what constitutes timely notice or insufficient notice.  
All other things being equal, it appears that states that require insurers to demonstrate 
prejudice from late notice are more likely to find notice timely, in part because the 
insurer’s failure to show prejudice in the instance case suggests that the notice was not 
in fact too late. . . . 
 However . . . courts in “no prejudice required” states also display variance in 
views regarding permissible delay. . . .  To avoid denying coverage to a policyholder, 
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course, not all courts are merciful when it comes to the law of 
conditions.  However, strictly construing the so-called conditions in an 
insurance policy may be principled at the expense of fairness.217 
As another device to avoid forfeiture, courts sometimes engraft a 
version of substantial performance onto the law of conditions, 218 but as 
a doctrinal matter substantial performance is not supposed to have any 
role in construing conditions.219  Nevertheless, while characterizing the 
insured’s responsibilities as conditions precedent, courts may not ask 
for strict performance, but instead may examine the “materiality” of the 
insured’s performance or the “substantial” character of the insured’s 
failure to comply.220 
A second consequence of characterizing the insured’s obligations 
as conditions is that the policyholder cannot breach the contract.221  
 
even where the insurer has suffered no prejudice, courts in such states are undoubtedly 
tempted to apply a liberal yardstick as to what constitutes tardiness or permit the 
tardiness to be excused. 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[B], at 9-13. 
 217 See JERRY, supra note 82, at 634 (“The traditional rule, and one that is still followed in 
some jurisdictions, is that timely notice is a condition precedent to coverage, and unexcused delay 
in giving notice will relieve the insurer of its obligations to the insured, whether or not the delay 
prejudiced the insurer.”). 
 218 See, e.g., MXL Indus. v. Mulder, 623 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that 
substantial performance applies to constructive conditions of exchange but not to express 
conditions; “an express condition precedent, unless otherwise excused, operates by agreement of 
the parties to define the satisfaction of a necessary antecedent to a party’s performance under the 
contract and is subject to the rule of strict compliance, unless such compliance is waived”). 
 219 See Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 
1995) (“Express conditions must be literally performed, whereas constructive conditions, which 
ordinarily arise from language of promise, are subject to the precept that substantial compliance is 
sufficient.”). 
 220 Burmac Metal Finishing Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 825 N.E.2d 1246, 1258 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 2005) (substantial compliance with conditions precedent); Watson v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 468 
N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1991) (express conditions in an insurance contract require substantial 
rather than strict compliance); Hoekstra v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 100, 106 
(Iowa 1986) (adopting substantial performance to insurance conditions); Haynes v. Dairyland 
Mut. Ins. Co., 199 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1972) (construing notice and cooperation as conditions 
precedent and stating insured has the obligation of showing “substantial performance”); PAJ, Inc. 
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 644 (Tex. 2008) (“Texas law, for example, has long 
recognized that ‘substantial compliance’ with a policy’s notice or proof-of-loss provisions will 
suffice and that trivial missteps in complying with notice or other policy requirements are 
excused.”); Munchenbach v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. CL-2005-6226, 2007 WL 
6002108, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) (notice is a condition precedent requiring substantial 
compliance).  
 221 Even good faith and fair dealing is not expected of a performing party in a unilateral 
contract.  See E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc., No. CV-00-8812-RMT (Mcx), 
2004 WL 5641999, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) (holding that because a promissory note is a 
unilateral contract, the lender completed the contract by lending the money, and “the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create a claim against the party that has already 
fully performed under a unilateral contract”). 
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Using Professor Wormser’s enduring Brooklyn Bridge hypo,222 
Professor Perillo explains: 
The distinction between an express condition and a promise is 
critical.  While failure to perform a promise, unless excused, is a 
breach, failure to comply with an express condition is not a 
breach. . . . If B does not walk the Bridge, B will not be liable 
because B did not promise to walk.  One cannot be liable for breach 
of contract unless one breaches a promise. 223 
Thus, if insurance is a unilateral contract, a policyholder must 
strictly meet conditions to obtain coverage (unless an anti-forfeiture 
device is applied), but a policyholder cannot breach the insurance 
contract by not meeting those conditions. 
For example, in a unilateral contract, the policyholder’s failure to 
“cooperate” with the insurer during the policy period is not a breach 
because the policyholder does not promise to cooperate.224  But 
cooperation is a condition of obtaining coverage, and therefore the 
policyholder’s failure to cooperate can result in forfeiture of coverage, 
unless a judicial doctrine ameliorates that result.  With forfeiture as the 
dire consequence, courts often expend inordinate amounts of effort 
determining just how uncooperative a policyholder may be without 
forfeiting. 
Winters v. State Farm & Fire Casualty Co.225 illustrates the 
challenges courts face when insurance is constructed as a unilateral 
contract and the policyholder’s duties as conditions of coverage.  In 
Winters, the policyholder homeowners filed a claim for fire damage.  
The state fire marshal suspected the fire was intentionally set and 
 
 222 According to Farnsworth, the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical is “the most durable and 
influential hypothetical in American legal education.”  FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, 
§ 3.24, at 356 (citing its origin as Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25).  In brief, party A 
states that he will give party B $100 if B walks across the Brooklyn Bridge.  If the offer is 
construed as an offer for a unilateral contract, A is seeking only the performance.  B cannot 
accept by promising to walk across the Bridge.  B must actually walk across the bridge, and the 
contract is formed when B finishes the walk.  Unilateral contracts such as this put B in jeopardy, 
because of another contract rule—offers are revocable until accepted.  That means that B could 
begin the perilous walk across the Bridge, and A could call out, “I revoke.”  Hence, Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts section 45 was created to protect B while he walked across the bridge by 
limiting A’s ability to revoke his offer once B begins performance.  Yet nothing binds B, who 
may decide to abandon the foolhardy stunt without incurring liability for breach.  See 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 3.24, at 356-62. 
 223 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.9, at 365-66. 
 224 Contrary to the rule that a failure to meet a condition is not a breach, courts frequently and 
carelessly speak of it as a breach.  See U.S.A. Elecs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 120 B.R. 
637, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (characterizing cooperation as a condition precedent and failure 
to cooperate a “material breach”); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Lingle, 133 So.2d 78 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1961) (construing a cooperation provision as a condition precedent and explaining that “‘a 
material breach of such a condition is frequently shown by the insured’s refusal to give the 
company whatever information he has respecting the claim’” (citation omitted)). 
 225 35 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Okla. 1999). 
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eventually charged the homeowners with arson.226  Due to the criminal 
investigation and pending charges, the policyholders would not make 
themselves available for examination under oath, despite their own 
concession that “pending criminal charges did not relieve them of their 
obligations under the insurance policy to give their examinations under 
oath.”227  State Farm then advised plaintiffs that they had failed to 
satisfy the conditions of cooperation and examination under oath and 
declined payment, while not formally and completely denying the 
claim.  When the arson charges finally were dismissed against the 
homeowners two years later, State Farm, for the first time, was able to 
take the plaintiffs’ depositions.228  State Farm claimed that the plaintiffs 
had “forfeited their right to recover under the policy by failing to submit 
to examinations under oath.”229  But the plaintiffs argued that they had 
“substantially complied with the terms of the policy provisions by 
providing all relevant documentation and by providing the depositions 
that were taken separately in the instant case.”230 
The Winters court characterized insurance as a reverse-unilateral 
contract.  Under this construction, the insured’s application and 
payment of the premium constituted the offer and “‘once the fire insurer 
accepts those acts and issues the fire policy, a unilateral contract is 
formed, that is, an act for a promise.’”231  As a result, “‘after the insured 
has paid the premium, only the insurer is legally bound (by its promises) 
to do anything.’”232  Therefore, “‘despite the many acts to be done by 
the insured under a fire insurance policy’” the insured is not legally 
obligated to perform those acts.233  Instead, the court constructed 
cooperation as condition of coverage.  As the court explained, “[a] 
condition is a shield not a sword” and “[c]onditions are usually 
precedent to that duty and must occur to trigger the duty contained in 
the promise.”234 
Faced with the all or nothing choice of coverage or forfeiture, the 
court assisted the policyholders by establishing a cooperation-prejudice 
rule akin to the notice-prejudice rule.  “[T]he purpose of the 
examination under oath is to enable the insurance company to 
investigate and pay the claim without prejudice, and it too makes sense 
that [the insurer] should be required to prove prejudice before denying 
 
 226 Id. at 843. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 844. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 845 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 1998)). 
 232 Id. (citing National Union, 957 P.2d at 363). 
 233 Id. (citing National Union, 957 P.2d at 363). 
 234 Id. (citing National Union, 957 P.2d at 363). 
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coverage.”235  Thus the court crafted a solution, because in its view the 
policyholder had substantially complied with the requirements and did 
not harm the insurer by the delay. 
Courts do not need to do violence to the law of conditions to reach 
the familiar ground of the law of promises in insurance disputes.236  
Insurance policies, like other contracts, should be construed as 
presumptively bilateral.237  The undertakings prescribed within the 
contract, especially when described as “duties,” should be interpreted as 
expressions of promise rather than as conditions.238  Similarly, 
particularly because the relationship between a policyholder and insurer 
is complex and lengthy, the policy is better classified as bilateral rather 
than unilateral or reverse-unilateral.  In the next section, we demonstrate 
that under traditional canons of contract interpretation, a policyholder’s 
obligations might appropriately be viewed as promises, and propose that 
a bilateral construction would have a salutary effect on the performance 
of insurance contracts.  We discuss several recent cases that found 
insurance contracts to be bilateral, and suggest that the results bring 
insurance contracts within traditional contract doctrine, rather than serve 
as an exception to it. 
 
2.     Contract Law’s Preference for Bilateral Contracts and Promises 
Should Apply to Insurance Contracts 
 
Although contract law has traditionally expressed a strong 
preference for a bilateral contract construction, the insurance contract 
appears the exception.239  Similarly, canons of contract interpretation 
 
 235 Id. at 846. 
 236 See Nicholas M. Insua & Matthew J. Delude, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts as a 
Useful Tool for Addressing Common Insurance Law Issues, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 19 (2007) 
(asserting that courts can benefit by looking to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to find 
alternative approaches to resolve insurance issues). 
 237 FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.24, at 356-57 (explaining that in doubtful 
cases it is preferable to interpret a contract as bilateral in order to protect the offeree from harsh 
results); see also Insua & Delude, supra note 236, at 35 (“[T]he Restatement would aid a court’s 
determination regarding whether the notice provision was a condition precedent or a promise to 
exchange performance” and provide “a preference of interpretation . . . for close questions.”). 
 238 For example, in PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2008), the majority 
expressed doubt that notice provisions are typically conditions precedent rather than covenants.  It 
noted that although the relevant provisions appeared in a section entitled “‘Commercial General 
Liability Conditions,’” they were in a subsection labeled “‘Duties in the Event of Occurrence’” 
and contained “language that more closely resemble[d] a covenant.”  Id. at 636.  In the case of 
ambiguity,“[c]onditions are not favored in the law; thus, when another reasonable reading would 
avoid a forfeiture is available, [the court] must construe contract language as a covenant rather 
than a condition.”  Id. 
 239 Elsewhere, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts perpetuates the view that insurance is 
largely unilateral.  For example, section 227 provides for standards of preference with regard to 
conditions.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1981).  It states a preference for 
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prefer construing clauses as promises, demanding that conditions be 
clearly expressed as such.240  Yet, a typical insurance contract is 
ambiguous at best, both with regard to whether it is bilateral or 
unilateral, and with regard to whether the insured’s obligations are 
expressed as conditions, promises, or promissory conditions. 
As an example, a typical homeowner’s insurance policy begins 
with the agreement to insure, often stating that the insurer provides 
insurance in return or exchange for payment of the premium and 
compliance with the policy provisions.241  A promise to insure in return 
 
interpretations that avoid forfeiture.  Moreover, if a provision is expressed as a condition, but the 
conditional event is a matter within the control of the party, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts favors a construction of a duty (promise) to make the condition occur: 
The rule in Subsection (2) states a preference for an interpretation that merely imposes 
a duty on the obligee to do the act and does not make the doing of the act a condition of 
the obligor’s duty. . . .  Unless the agreement makes it clear that the event is required as 
a condition, it is fairer to apply these more flexible rules. 
Id. cmt. d. Yet it states that the rule is inapplicable to insurance, based upon some vague “general 
understanding that only the insurer undertakes duties, the term will be interpreted as making that 
event a condition of the insurer’s duty rather than as imposing a duty on the insured.”  Id. 
Furthermore, this standard of preference does not apply when the contract is of a type 
under which only the obligor general undertakes duties.  It therefore does not apply to 
the typical insurance contract under which only the insurer generally undertakes duties, 
and a term requiring an act to be done by the insured is not subject to this standard of 
preference. 
Id. 
 240 See Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 
1995) (“In determining whether a particular agreement makes an event a condition courts will 
interpret doubtful language as embodying a promise or constructive condition rather than an 
express condition.”).  The Restatement provides: 
§ 227. Standards Of Preference With Regard To Conditions 
(1) In resolving doubts as to whether an event is made a condition of an obligor’s duty, 
and as to the nature of such an event, an interpretation is preferred that will reduce the 
obligee’s risk of forfeiture, unless the event is within the obligee’s control or the 
circumstances indicate that he has assumed the risk. 
(2) Unless the contract is of a type under which only one party generally undertakes 
duties, when it is doubtful whether 
(a) a duty is imposed on an obligee that an event occur, or 
(b) the event is made a condition of the obligor’s duty, or 
(c) the event is made a condition of the obligor’s duty and a duty is imposed on 
the obligee that the event occur, the first interpretation is preferred if the event is 
within the obligee’s control. 
(3) In case of doubt, an interpretation under which an event is a condition of an 
obligor’s duty is preferred over an interpretation under which the non-occurrence of the 
event is a ground for discharge of that duty after it has become a duty to perform. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1981). 
 241 Property and casualty insurance policies typically state that the insurer will insure in 
“‘return for the premium and compliance . . . with applicable provisions in this policy.’”  Martin 
v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 06-6889, 2007 WL 2071662, at *2 (E.D. La. July 13, 2007); accord 
Lloyd’s of London v. Pagan-Sanchez, 539 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2008); Joseph v. Unitrin, Inc., No. 
1:08-CV-077, 2008 WL 3822938 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2008); GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 
No. 1:06CV315-SA-JAD, 2008 WL 2817098 (N.D. Miss. July 18, 2008); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Fischer, No. CV-F-07-1410 OWW/DLB, 2008 WL 1970639, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2008).  A 
Commercial General Liability policy provides “‘in return for the payment of the premium and 
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for payment is merely a recital of the consideration exchanged.  That 
insuring language does not preclude a bilateral construction of the 
contract; after all, it is not uncommon in bilateral contracts to exchange 
payment for performance. 
Thereafter, in a typical policy, the insurer itemizes obligations of 
the policyholder upon a loss in a section of the contract entitled 
“Conditions.”  Within the Conditions section, however, there are 
frequently provisions that are not conditions at all; some of the 
provisions describe undertakings of the insurer, and others set out 
procedures for establishing one’s claims.242  It is axiomatic that merely 
labeling a contract provision as a condition does not make it so.  Again 
turning to a homeowner’s insurance policy as an example, some of the 
enumerated actions the insured must take after a loss are expressed as 
duties243—a word that evokes a promissory obligation.  Other 
provisions make clear that failure to comply renders the contract 
void.244 
At least a few courts, most notably in a line of cases in Maryland, 
have turned to traditional canons of construction and clearly 
transformed the presumptively unilateral insurance contract into a 
bilateral contract.245  These courts have characterized at least some of 
 
subject to all the terms of this policy, we agree to provide the insurance stated in this policy.’”  
Commerce Bank, N.A. v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-669-JPG, 2009 WL 702220, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 
Mar. 17, 2009) (emphasis omitted); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regency Furniture, Inc., 
963 A.2d 253, 260 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).  
 242 For example, an ISO homeowners policy contains a section labeled “conditions.”  It 
contains provisions identifying duties of the insured, such as providing notice and proof of loss.  
But conditions sections also contain provisions that cannot be construed as conditions.  For 
example, loss settlement provisions describe procedures the insurer follows in valuing and paying 
claims.  These are not conditions of coverage.  See e.g., Goff v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 999 
So.2d 684 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008) (describing loss settlement procedures in conditions section of a 
homeowner’s policy); Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 983 So.2d 66 (La. 2008) (same). 
 243 For example, the liability portion of a homeowner’s policy describes “Duties After Loss” 
in which it requires the insured to provide notice, information, and the names of witnesses and 
possible claimants.  See ISO, Homeowner’s 3 Special Form Section II Conditions , HO 00 03 04 
91 (1990), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 42.  
 244 For example, standard homeowners’ policies usually state that “concealment or fraud” 
renders the policy void.  See, e.g., Lanier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 5:07CV129-V, 2009 
WL 926914, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2009). 
  The term “duty” is frequently associated with promises, and particularly distinguished from 
conditions.  For example, Farnsworth characterizes duty as a promissory term: “[I]t can be said 
that promises, which impose duties, and conditions, which make duties conditional, are the main 
components of agreements.”  FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.2, at 414.  Calamari 
and Perillo employ the term “duty” to refer to the “promisor’s duty to perform a promise” as 
distinguished from conditions for which a party has no duty.  See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.2, 
at 361.  Conceptually, a promise creates a duty to perform and a condition places a limit on that 
promissory duty. 
 245 See Snyder v. Chester Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Md. 2003) (construing 
cooperation clauses as a covenant requiring substantial compliance); Lindsey v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., No. CIV. A. AW-00-132, 2000 WL 1597763 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2000) (construing 
duties after loss as covenants requiring substantial performance); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
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the undertakings the insured performs under an insurance contract as 
promises subject to substantial performance.  When an insured enters 
into a contract, these courts posit that the insured has made affirmative 
promises to the insurer: to cooperate, to give timely notice, to provide 
documents, and to participate in the defense of the case under a liability 
policy.  The effect of constructing these obligations as promissory is 
that a judge can invoke substantial performance rather than strict 
compliance to decide difficult cases.246  These courts do not need to 
painstakingly search for an excuse, prejudice, waiver, or estoppel in 
order to avoid forfeiture.247 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Himelfarb248 illustrates a situation 
in which the policyholder’s responsibilities under the insurance policy 
were construed as promises and the decision more predictably followed 
 
Himelfarb, 736 A.2d 295 (Md. 1999) (construing the sworn proof of loss provision of a 
commercial property insurance policy as a covenant calling for substantial rather than strict 
compliance). 
 246 Eugene Anderson, who often writes from the pro-insured position, has argued forcefully 
for the application of substantial performance in judging the insured’s performance of duties such 
as notice and cooperation: 
Forfeiture is an unfair, draconian remedy that should no longer be applied in insurance 
law, routinely or otherwise.  A policyholder who has paid premiums and purchased an 
insurance policy that is affected with a public interest should be treated at least as 
favorably as a party to any type of contract.  In the world of insurance, forfeiture as a 
punishment does not fit the crime.  Draconian forfeitures can be eliminated by the 
simple application of traditional contractual remedies, notably, the doctrine of 
substantial performance.  When a policyholder has regularly paid premiums on his 
policy, courts should find that the insurance policy has been substantially performed 
and that the insurance company’s recovery for noncompliance with a policy condition 
should be limited to damages or recoupment for the harm suffered. 
Eugene R. Anderson et al., Draconian Forfeitures of Insurance: Commonplace, Indefensible, and 
Unnecessary, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 861 (1996).  We prefer to go to the root of the problem 
instead of engrafting substantial performance onto conditions.  Courts do not need to recast the 
law of conditions.  They need only recognize that duties under an insurance policy that sound 
“promissory,” such as providing notice, cooperation, and proof of loss, should be construed as 
promises as provided by traditional contracts law. 
 247 The substantial performance test is sufficiently nuanced for concepts like prejudice to find 
a comfortable home within it.  For example, in testing the materiality of a breach, the Restatement 
(Second) provides that the following circumstances are significant: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of 
that benefit of which he will be deprived; 
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer 
forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his 
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).  Thus, looking for substantial 
performance invites a rich consideration of, among other factors, the harm to the insurer, the 
harshness of forfeiture, and the nature of the nonperformance. 
 248 736 A.2d at 295. 
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contract law principles.  In Himelfarb, a commercial policyholder’s 
warehouse was burgled.  At the time, the insured’s premises were leased 
to a failing business that was in bankruptcy.249  Himelfarb reported the 
theft to its agent and engaged a public adjuster to assist in pressing its 
insurance claim.  As provided by the policy, Hartford then requested a 
sworn proof of loss within sixty days of the loss.250  Himelfarb provided 
a sworn statement, but Hartford deemed it incomplete because it lacked 
an itemized list of losses.  In particular, Himelfarb was having difficulty 
obtaining an itemized list of property auctioned in the lessee’s 
bankruptcy proceedings, a necessary crosscheck to determine precisely 
what had been stolen.251  Six months after the sixty-day deadline for 
proof of loss passed, Himelfarb finally provided an itemized list of 
stolen items.  Hartford rejected the claim on the grounds that the proof 
of loss was untimely. 
Himelfarb filed suit to recover for its losses.252  On appeal, the 
issue was whether the trial court was correct to grant Hartford summary 
judgment on the grounds that Himelfarb did not strictly comply with a 
condition precedent to coverage.253  The court first stated that it would 
interpret the insurance contract in the same manner as it would “any 
other contract,” including finding “‘the intent of the parties to be 
gathered from the words they have employed, and in case of ambiguity, 
after resort to the other permissible aids to interpretation.’”254  The court 
observed that the proof of loss provisions that Hartford claimed to be 
express conditions were ambiguously stated and could be covenants, not 
conditions.255  It explained that although the section containing the 
proof of loss provision was labeled “Loss Conditions,” not all the 
provisions in the section were express conditions precedent; some 
described actions that Hartford, not its policyholders, was to 
undertake.256 
In addition, while the provisions were labeled as conditions, the 
court determined that the obligations were not expressed in the familiar 
language of conditions,257 but were expressed as a “duty on the 
 
 249 Id. at 297-98. 
 250 Id. at 298. 
 251 Id. at 299. 
 252 Id.  
 253 Id. at 297.  The trial court ruled in favor of Hartford, a Court of Special Appeals reversed, 
remanding the case for trial.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and affirmed 
the reversal.  Id at 299. 
 254 Id. at 300 (quoting Chirichella v. Erwin, 310 A.2d 555, 557 (Md. 1973)). 
 255 Id. at 300-01. 
 256 Id. at 300 (observing that one provision discussed Hartford’s option of payment or repair or 
replacement, and noting that “[p]ayment by Hartford clearly is not a condition precedent to 
Hartford’s obligation to pay”). 
 257 The court explained, “‘[a]lthough no particular form of words is necessary in order to 
create an express condition, such words and phrases as ‘if’ and ‘provided that,’ are commonly 
used to indicate that performance has been expressly made conditional as have the words ‘when,’ 
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insured.”258  “Under these circumstances construction of [the proof of 
loss provision] as a covenant, rather than an express condition, is the 
preferred construction.”259  Once the proof of loss provision had been 
construed as a covenant rather than as an express condition, the court 
was free to consider substantial performance in providing proof of loss, 
even while not meeting the strict terms of the policy. 
Substantial performance by the insured of the covenant as of the 
specified date may be found if, by that date, two elements are 
present: (1) the insured has furnished the insurer with information 
reasonably requested by the insurer to the extent that it is reasonably 
possible for the insured to do so, and (2) the insured expressly or 
impliedly promises to submit, when and as it is reasonably possible 
for the insured to do so, the balance of the information.260 
The appellate court reversed Hartford’s summary judgment and 
remanded the case for trial, holding that whether Himelfarb 
substantially performed under the proof of loss provision was a question 
for the trier of fact.261  Himelfarb’s construction of insurance as bilateral 
allowed the court to follow contract law’s doctrine of substantial 
performance in order to protect the policyholder from unfair forfeiture.  
In contrast, the construction of insurance as a unilateral contract in 
Winters required the court to invent a novel exception to the law of 
conditions in order to obtain a just result. 
Importantly, once a contract is constructed as bilateral and once a 
policyholder owes a return promise, the policyholder’s performance 
includes an implied promise of good faith.262  Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Altfillisch Construction Co.263 is a rare insurance case in which a 
court found a promissory exchange of an implied promise of good faith 
on the policyholder’s part.  There, the policyholder’s equipment was 
damaged by the insured’s lessee.  The equipment was covered under a 
policy with Liberty Mutual.  Unbeknownst to Liberty Mutual, the 
 
‘after,’ ‘as soon as,’ or ‘subject to.’” Id. (quoting Chirichella v. Erwin, 310 A.2d 555, 557 (Md. 
1973)). 
 258 Id.  
 259 Id. at 300-01 (citing cases and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227(2) 
(1981)). 
 260 Id. at 306. 
 261 Id. at 306-07.  The court observed that the property was not owned by the Himelfarbs, they 
did not live in the same city, and they had no way to know what was stolen until they could 
compare “the before break-in and after break-in inventories” by obtaining the information from 
the bankruptcy.  Id. 
 262 When insurance is construed as a unilateral contract, the insured fully performs by paying 
the premium, and cannot thereafter breach.  It follows that the insured has made no implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the insurer.  See E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford 
Holdings, Inc., No. CV-00-8812-RMT (Mcx), 2004 WL 5641999, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) 
(“[A]s a matter of law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create a claim 
against the party that has already fully performed under a unilateral contract.”). 
 263 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
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policyholder had made a prior agreement with the lessee to “insure 
lessee against risks resulting from its possession” of policyholder’s 
equipment.264  This agreement had the effect of cutting off Liberty 
Mutual’s opportunity for subrogation for any losses attributable to the 
lessee’s negligence. 
Under the casualty policy, “Condition No. 17” provided for 
subrogation and required that “‘the insured shall execute and deliver 
instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such 
rights.’”265  Because the side agreement between the policyholder and 
its lessee occurred before the loss occurred, Condition No. 17, which 
protected the insurer’s right of subrogation after loss, did not technically 
apply.266 
The court considered whether impairing the insurer’s potential 
right of subrogation violated the policyholder’s implied promise of good 
faith and fair dealing.  Reviewing the rise of insurance bad faith in tort, 
the court explained: 
 Faced with this sweeping and portentous pronouncement on the 
force and dignity of such covenants, we find no difficulty in 
construing the scope of their impact to devolve alike upon the 
insured as well as the insurer and that a breach thereof by the insured 
would lead to the same legal consequences as any garden variety 
breach of contract.267 
The court then concluded that the policyholder violated the 
covenant of good faith in bargaining away and therefore frustrating the 
insurer’s “expectation of opportunities to subrogate in the event of a 
loss caused by the negligence of a third party.”268 
Altfillisch recognizes insurance as an ongoing mutual relationship 
between policyholder and insurer, and recognizes that the 
policyholder’s performance is not complete at the time the premium is 
paid, at least if the policyholder is to have coverage.  Rather, the 
policyholder, like the insurer, has made an ongoing promise to engage 
in good faith and fair dealing.269 
 
 264 Id. at 92. 
 265 Id. at 94. 
 266 Id. at 94-95. 
 267 Id. at 95. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Without addressing the unilateral versus bilateral contract question, a number of courts 
have said that good faith and fair dealing is a two-way street in an insurance policy.  See, e.g., 
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958) (“There is an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which 
will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.  This principle is 
applicable to policies of insurance.” (citation omitted)); Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221, 231-32 
(8th Cir. 1977) (“ Where a claim is made against an insured which may exceed policy limits, and 
where the insured and insurer may each incur liability, then each assumes an obligation to act in 
good faith, to face the facts realistically, and to maintain a mutual respect for the interests of the 
other. . . .  This standard of good faith and mutual respect applies to both parties to the insurance 
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The notion that a policyholder makes ongoing promises subject to 
good faith and substantial performance cures a variety of evils.  First, it 
has a salutary effect on the behavior of policyholders by infusing a 
mutual expectation of good faith into their relationship with the insurer.  
Second, it removes the hammer of forfeiture that comes with conditions 
and allows courts to evaluate conduct through the more reasonable lens 
of substantial performance.  It thus enables policyholders to obtain 
coverage as expected without regard to technical breaches.  We also 
suspect that lowering the stakes for minor deviations from policy 
provisions from all-or-nothing may reduce the allure of litigation and 
enable the parties to better self assess where the contractual relationship 
stands. 
 
3.     The Unjustified Absence of Anticipatory Repudiation 
 
Traditionally, the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation has not 
applied to unilateral contracts, although the limitation certainly does not 
have universal support. 270  The unilateral construction of the insurance 
 
contract.”); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986) (“ Thus, firmly established law 
indicates that the insurance contract between plaintiffs and Farmers included a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, implied in law, whereby each of the parties was bound to refrain from any 
action which would impair the benefits which the other had the right to expect from the contract 
or the contractual relationship.”); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Morris, 741 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1987) 
(Holohan, J. dissenting) (asserting that insured owed a duty of good faith to insurer).  A 
reciprocal implied promise, by itself, necessitates a bilateral construction of the contract, for it 
implies that an insured does indeed have return obligations toward the insurer. 
 270 Criticism of limiting anticipatory repudiation is based on the concept that even in executed 
contracts, anticipatory repudiation has an immediate cost.  See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 2, § 
12.9, at 440 (taking the view that the exception for unilateral contracts is indefensible); 
WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 63.63 (concluding that when an insurer wrongfully refuses to accept 
a premium it is not an anticipatory repudiation, but immediate breach and full damages should be 
recovered).  An early commentator explained the hostility to the limitation: 
  This basis for the distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts in regard to 
anticipatory breach is, therefore, unsound.  “The best reasons for allowing an 
immediate action for an anticipatory repudiation are that it frequently causes 
immediate loss in property values, it disturbs the mind and serenity of the promisee, 
and immediate action makes for an early settlement of the dispute and a timely 
payment of damages.”  These apply to unilateral as well as bilateral contracts.  
Repudiation reduces the sale value of the chose in action, for few people care to 
purchase a lawsuit.  Also, the plaintiff should not be forced to bring a series of lawsuits 
for the regular installments, and in the meantime suffer discomfort and poverty. 
Comment, Anticipatory Breach of Unilateral Contracts, 36 YALE L.J. 263, 265-66 (1926) (citing 
SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, CONTRACTS 464 (1924)). 
  Even Professor Wormser, who was once the strongest proponent of aggressive application 
of unilateral contract concepts, saw the traditional anticipatory breach as “anomalous” and 
restricted to contract conditions rather than a useful rule of damages.  See Wormser, Book Review, 
supra note 46.  Had Professor Wormser been an insurance scholar like Professor Patterson, he 
might have also realized the occasional mischief anticipatory breach doctrine worked in the 
context of traditional unilateral contract theory.  As one court observed: 
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contract precludes applying anticipatory repudiation doctrine by those 
courts that adhere to the rule that anticipatory repudiation does not 
apply when contracts are fully executed on one side.  Refusing to allow 
policyholders to obtain relief for anticipatory repudiation prevents the 
policyholder from obtaining complete relief where an insurer 
wrongfully refuses to provide coverage under an ongoing policy. 
As a result, the policyholder wrongfully denied coverage may be 
required to repeatedly seek relief seriatim as the insurer fails to deliver 
promised payment after promised payment.  Worse yet, the policyholder 
may be required to continue to pretend the contract is in effect and 
continue to perform, including paying premiums,271 even when it is 
clear the insurer will not be providing coverage.  When an insurer 
refuses to perform, the insured should be able to suspend any return 
performance, thereby treating the contract as at an end. 
Regarding anticipatory repudiation, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts section 253 states the general rule presumptively applicable 
to bilateral contracts: “Where an obligor repudiates a duty before he has 
committed a breach by non-performance and before he has received all 
of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone gives rise to a claim 
for damages for total breach.”272 
However, under a unilateral contract construction, the policyholder 
has given and the insurer has received all of the agreed exchange—the 
payment of the premium—when the contract was formed.  Thus, if the 
language of section 253 is read literally, the insurer’s prospective 
repudiation should not give rise to an immediate claim for damages; 
instead, the insured must wait until the breach actually occurs.273  
Although this seems intrinsically wrong, the authors of the Restatement 
 
 There is some disagreement whether the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation 
applies only to bilateral contracts or to both bilateral and unilateral contracts.  
Insurance policies are generally unilateral contracts.  A D&O insurance policy is a 
unilateral contract—the insured has already performed by paying the premium in 
exchange for the insurance company’s promise to provide insurance.  Nevertheless, 
there is ample authority for the proposition that the promising party can anticipatorily 
repudiate a unilateral contract. 
Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 271 Situations of this sort make the unilateral characterization of insurance policies and the 
traditional view toward anticipatory repudiation look idiotic.  The insurance policy is supposed to 
be unilateral or reverse-unilateral—yet the policyholder continues to do the act (premium 
payment) which supposedly was complete prior to contract formation and the court needlessly 
burdens the victim of the contract breach with additional transaction costs that impede relief.  
Under these circumstances, insurers have lowered incentives to make reasonable coverage 
determinations, especially if the relevant state’s bad faith law is weak.  In addition, absent an 
exception to the traditional American bar on recovery of counsel fees by the prevailing party, a 
policyholder wrongfully denied coverage is not made whole. 
 272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 273 See Davis v. First Nat’l Bank, 605 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that the 
insurer “could not breach what had become a unilateral contract until the time for performance 
had arrived”). 
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apparently meant for this result.  Commentary to section 253 states “it is 
one of the established limits on the doctrine of ‘anticipatory breach’ that 
an obligor’s repudiation alone . . . gives rise to no claim for damages at 
all if he has already received all of the agreed exchange for it.”274 
The rationale for the rule that a contract that has been fully 
performed on one side cannot trigger anticipatory repudiation stems 
from the idea that the non-breaching party cannot be harmed by waiting 
for the time of breach.  Under this view, the non-breaching party owes 
nothing more that could be put at risk by the threatened breach.275  But 
this assessment must be incorrect as applied to insurance in that the 
purpose of the insurance policy is risk management, protection against 
contingent loss, and “peace of mind.”  These objectives are threatened 
enough merely from the possibility that an insurer will become 
insolvent, wrongfully deny a claim, or undervalue a claim.  Where the 
insurer has already expressed intent to breach, the value of the policy to 
the policyholder has been severely undermined and perhaps even 
vitiated. 
The problem of inadequate resort to judicial relief based upon 
anticipatory repudiation sometimes arises in an insurance contract in 
which periodic payments are due, such as under a disability insurance 
policy.276  If an insurance policy is unilateral, it follows under the 
conventional rule that the policyholder cannot treat the insurer’s refusal 
to make a periodic payment as a total repudiation.  Therefore, the 
policyholder is left to other devices, such as filing multiple suits or a 
declaratory action.  In the courts that follow the conventional rule, 
characterizing the contract as unilateral means that a suit for total 
repudiation is unavailing.  This transforms what might otherwise be an 
interesting damage issue into an anticipatory breach problem.  This 
 
 274 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 cmt. c (1981). 
 275 To understand the basis for the limitation, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 
Reporter’s Notes cmt. c (1981) directs readers to the dissenting opinion in Federal Life Insurance 
Company v. Rascoe.  That opinion explains:  
Where his part of the contract has been executed by the plaintiff, he has nothing to do but 
to wait, and to do so continues to be in his power.  His position will not be prejudicially 
changed by defendant’s repudiation; and hence he will have no estoppel to rely upon to 
precipitate the defendant’s obligation. 
Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F.2d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 1926) (Denison, J., dissenting). 
 276 Some courts recognize a “narrow exception” in the case of periodic payments.  These 
courts distinguish between insurers that repudiate the policy in its entirety and those that dispute 
whether payments are owed.  
[T]here is a narrow exception to this rule which provides for recovery of future benefits, 
where the insurer has repudiated the entire policy.  This exception is applicable only 
where a plaintiff establishes that the insurer has committed an anticipatory breach by 
“disclaim[ing] the intention or the duty to shape its conduct in accordance with the 
provisions of the contract.”  
Wurm v. Commercial Ins. Co., 766 N.Y.S.2d 8, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (quoting N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 676 (1936)). 
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means that despite a material breach by an insurer (e.g., the refusal to 
make periodic payments), a policyholder cannot obtain the full value of 
promised coverage and end the relationship with the insurer.277 
When a court construes the insurance contract as unilateral, 
thereby limiting a policyholder’s use of anticipatory repudiation, it 
dooms the policyholder to an ongoing relationship with a breaching 
party.  Consider the problem for Charles Fanning, who purchased an 
accident insurance policy from Guardian Life Insurance Company of 
America.278  Fanning was issued a conditional binding receipt.  After 
Guardian received the premium, but before it issued the policy, Fanning 
suffered a serious injury that “totally and permanently disabled him.”279  
Guardian declined Fanning’s application and denied coverage, claiming 
the contract had not yet been formed.280  The jury rejected the insurer’s 
position, finding the contract had formed.  Fanning also established that 
he was permanently disabled and so the jury awarded damages that 
reflected the present value of the amount of money owed over his life 
expectancy.281  The jury’s award provided Fanning with $27,730, a 
lump sum sufficient to pay him $100 per month over his life 
expectancy.282 
The Washington Supreme Court agreed with Fanning and the jury 
that Guardian had erroneously taken the position that there was no 
contract, that Guardian had wrongfully refused to pay under any 
circumstance, and that this constituted a total breach.  Nevertheless, the 
court reversed and held in favor of Guardian on the issue of the amount 
of damages owed.283  The court concluded that Fanning could not obtain 
damages for total breach.  Citing a “great weight of authority,” the court 
explained that anticipatory breach applies only to bilateral contracts, 
and then sided with “a majority of the jurisdictions [that] refuse to allow 
recovery for breach by anticipatory repudiation of a unilateral contract 
 
 277 See, e.g., Garage & Serv. Station Emps. Union v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins., 82 Cal. Rptr. 821 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that group life insurer’s refusal to recognize cancelled life 
insurance contract presented a cause of action only as to deceased insured; thirteen living 
members had no cause of action based on anticipatory repudiation); Greguhn v. Mut. of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1969) (ordering periodic payments until insured recovers or 
dies and citing “the great majority of decisions” that allows payment “only of installments 
accrued and unpaid”). 
  While adhering to the rule that anticipatory repudiation is inapplicable to unilateral 
contracts, some jurisdictions carve out an exception for bad faith, allowing a lump-sum payment 
where the insurer has acted in bad faith.  See Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 
998, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying California law and allowing future payments in tort); 
DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 554 N.W.2d 225 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). 
 278 Fanning v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 366 P.2d 207 (Wash. 1961). 
 279 Id. at 208. 
 280 Id. at 209. 
 281 Id. at 210. 
 282 Id. at 209-10. 
 283 Id. 
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or of a bilateral contract that has become unilateral.”284  The appellate 
court concluded that it was sufficient to hold that the insurer owed 
Fanning continuing monthly payments as provided by the contract, 
rather than awarding a lump sum, even though the insurer’s conduct 
constituted a total breach.285 
Had the court characterized the insurance contract as bilateral,286 
the court might have allowed Fanning a more satisfactory and complete 
remedy for Guardian’s breach.  The court might have recognized that 
Fanning and the insurer had made ongoing bilateral promises to one 
another—Fanning to continue to cooperate and to submit continuing 
proof of disability and Guardian to make ongoing payments.  Although 
the court acknowledged that Fanning had continuing duties under the 
policy to make himself available and submit to periodic physical 
evaluations, the court called this duty “too trivial” and 
“inconsequential” as to be an bilateral duty under the contract.287 
Had the court instead recognized that Fanning had made reciprocal 
promises and that a bilateral relationship existed, under the doctrine of 
anticipatory repudiation, the court might have terminated Fanning’s 
continuing obligation to cooperate in light of Guardian’s breach and 
fashioned a remedy that relieved Fanning of duties to Guardian and 
allowed him to sever the relationship.  Instead, Fanning was forced to 
remain in a lifelong contractual relationship with an insurer—even to 
the extent of submitting to regular physical examinations at its behest—
that had breached the contract and wrongfully denied him the disability 
benefits he had purchased.  In light of the fact that an essential aspect of 
insurance is that the policyholder purchases peace of mind that the 
insurer will pay in the event of contingent losses, to force the 
policyholder to remain in a relationship after breach is particularly 
problematic. 
The court ignored the bilateral nature of the disability policy.  For 
example, in order to collect benefits, Fanning had ongoing duties to 
establish his disability and to submit proof of his continuing disability.  
Once construed as a bilateral contract, the court might have recognized 
 
 284 Id. at 211. 
 285 Fanning argued that the rule adopted was not sound, because “if defendant company 
becomes hostile to the insured, plaintiff may be compelled to bring an action on every 
installment.”  Id. at 212.  The court rejected that possibility as an unlikely business practice which 
could be sanctioned.  Id. (citing Cobb v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 P.2d 84, 88 (Cal. 1935)).  The 
court also rejected Fanning’s argument that the insurer was a foreign corporation, and so future 
performance might not be assured.  Id. 
 286 The insured had obligations under the accident policy, including an obligation to pay the 
seven dollar balance on his premium payment, and to provide ongoing evidence of his disability 
and documents for reimbursement.  The court did not address the seven dollar balance, but it 
specifically rejected construing the insurer’s right to demand an examination to verify the 
disability as an exchanged promise.  Id. at 210. 
 287  Id. 
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that an absolute refusal to pay the benefits constituted a total breach that 
allowed Fanning to terminate the contract and sue for breach.  Then the 
issue of whether to give Fanning a lump sum award or something else 
would have been reduced to a damages issue, as it properly should be.  
The court might still not have allowed a lump sum award because that 
amount would be speculative, but it might have explored other forms of 
damages, such as a sum sufficient to replace the insurance or to 
purchase an annuity to reproduce the payments.  Instead, by not 
allowing anticipatory breach, the court may have left Fanning in a 
troubled relationship, yet unable to sever ties. 
 
4.     Adherence to a Unilateral Contract Characterization Excessively 
Focuses upon the Act of Paying Premiums 
 
There exists yet another inconvenient artifact of a unilateral 
construction.  When payment of the premium is the sine qua non of 
contract formation, missteps in the payment process can have 
inappropriately harsh consequences.  When the insurance contract is 
characterized as a unilateral contract, too much attention must be paid to 
the actual payment of the premium as a test of formation. 
However, there logically is no single method to form an insurance 
contract; “formation depends on the objective reasonable expectations 
of the parties.”288  The insurance contract may form with a formal 
document, an oral agreement, through the acts of an agent, with an offer 
from the insured accepted by the insurer, with an offer from the insurer 
accepted by the insured, or through bilateral promises.289  “Many 
insurers will issue a policy premised on a policyholder’s promise to pay 
premiums when billed, and this promise is also effective as 
consideration.”290  Such varied practices suggest that insurers do not 
necessarily regard the payment of the premium as a condition precedent 
to formation. 
When courts construe payment as a condition precedent to the 
formation of the contract, they then must unnecessarily struggle with 
formation issues concerning payment by check, payment by check with 
insufficient funds, or lost payments.291  In a bilateral construction, 
 
 288 3 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 10.2. 
 289 Among the varied methods of formation, see generally id. § 10.1 (formation through 
formal written contracts); id. § 10.2 (oral formation); id. (formation through agents of the insured 
or insurer); id. § 10.5 (formation without payment of first premium). 
 290 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9-144.3 to 9-144.4 (3d ed. 2008 
Supp.); see supra note 120 (describing the variety of methods of payment). 
 291  3 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3 §10.5; 5 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 24.2; JERRY, supra note 82, § 71[a]-[g], at 613-23 (describing 
payment problems and formation); see Hartline v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d 
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payment also serves as a promise to pay, and that means that dishonored 
checks,292 errors in mailing,293 partial payments,294 or any other of 
myriad payment glitches that might befall an insured will not result in a 
risk of forfeiture.  Moreover, the view that a policyholder’s acceptance 
of insurance indicates a promise to pay for that insurance reflects a 
more realistic intent of both parties. 
One of the reasons the insurance policy is viewed as unilateral is 
that it achieves an expectation the parties seem to share that the insurer 
has no cause of action against the policyholder for failure to pay the 
premium.  As Dean Jerry explains, “If . . . the insured fails to perform 
the duty to pay premiums, the insurer is ordinarily not entitled to force 
the insured to make the payments or to collect damages for the insured’s 
nonperformance.”295  In Dean Jerry’s view, “paying the premium is 
more a condition . . . than it is a duty,” and thus the “insurer does not 
have the remedy of suing the insured for the unpaid premium.”296 
Under the unilateral concept of the insurance policy, payment of 
the premium is a “‘condition precedent to the liability of the insurer’” 
and not “a ‘debt’ in the sense that the insurer can enforce payment of 
the premium.”297  Thus, as in any unilateral contract, nonperformance 
by the non-promising party is not regarded as a breach of contract. 
[C]ourts and texts often refer to a “duty” of the policyholder to pay 
premiums, but that is not strictly accurate since the policyholder 
suffers no liability for breaching its promise to pay by rejecting a 
policy that has been issued and seldom is sued for breach if it elects 
to stop paying the premium.298 
Nevertheless, both the policyholder’s right to reject the insurance 
(by not paying the premium), as well as the insurer’s right to terminate 
 
470 (D.R.I. 2005) (finding that a policy lapsed where check for renewal premium was overdue 
and dishonored for insufficient funds); Johnson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 398 So.2d 317 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1981) (affirming finding of no coverage where initial premium check was dishonored for 
insufficient funds); Tallent v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1990) 
(concluding that a dishonored premium check was not sufficient to renew coverage); Ancro Fin. 
Co. v. Consumers USA Ins. Co., No. 02A01-9708-CV-00177, 1998 WL 684838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1998) (holding that no policy was in effect where a premium check did not clear because of an 
alleged bank error that led to a stop-payment order). 
 292 See 5 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 24.6 (discussing various 
approaches to dishonored check cases where payment of the first premium is a condition 
precedent). 
 293 Id. § 24.2. 
 294 Id. § 27.10 (discussing the legal effect of partial payments). 
 295 JERRY, supra note 82, § 71[b], at 612. 
 296 Id.  There are cases where insurers or agents do file suit for payment of the premium rather 
than terminate the policy.  See, e.g., In re Miller Estate, No. 6-78-630, 1980 WL 845 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1980) (holding that insurer may waive the right to terminate for nonpayment of 
premiums and instead keep a delinquent policy in force and collect the premiums owed). 
 297 5 HOLMES’ APPELMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 24.2 (quoting Presentation Sisters 
v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 452, 458-59 (S.D. 1971)). 
 298 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 9.06[A], 9-145. 
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the coverage for non-payment, remain rights that can be preserved in a 
bilateral construct.  Even in a bilateral contract formed by a promise to 
provide insurance coverage and an exchange promise to pay a premium, 
the insurer will likely elect not to sue the policyholder for an unpaid 
premium, but instead will terminate for nonpayment and waive 
damages.299  An advantage of bilateral characterization is that it allows 
the policyholder to avoid the many dangerous formation issues that 




The traditional view of the insurance policy as a unilateral or 
reverse-unilateral contract is both largely incorrect and generally 
unhelpful in resolving the types of contract issues that surround the 
insurance relationship, creating several pernicious side effects.  
Characterizing insurance contracts as bilateral relationships is both 
appropriate and advantageous.  First, in moving toward recognition of 
insurance as bilateral, courts can adhere to familiar, traditional canons 
of contract interpretation and abandon a presumption that seems without 
rationale.  Second, a bilateral construction allows courts to avoid the 
rigidity of the law of conditions and instead more consistently and 
transparently employ the doctrines of substantial performance, 
mutuality of good faith and fair dealing, and anticipatory repudiation.  
These doctrines provide stability and fairness for the insurer-
policyholder relationship.  Finally, a bilateral construction pays less 
attention to the roles of premium payment and the usually unimportant 
issue of contract formation, and better recognizes the complexities, 
nuances, and overall objectives of the insurer-policyholder relationship. 
 
 299 Practically speaking, when it occurs with the first payment, the insurer has suffered little 
damage.  On the other hand, when the insurer has provided coverage for a period of time, it may 
desire to collect the premium owed.  “[I]nsurers often forgo efforts to collect where the premium 
due is relatively small, where it was at risk for a short period of time and incurred no claims, or 
where collection efforts would be bad public relations for the insurer.”  Id. § 9-145 n.417. 
